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AD HOC DIPLOMATS
RYAN M. SCOVILLE†
ABSTRACT
Article II of the Constitution grants the president power to appoint
“Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers” with the advice and
consent of the Senate. By all accounts, this language requires Senate
confirmation for the appointment of resident ambassadors and other
diplomats of similar rank and tenure. Yet these are hardly the only
agents of U.S. foreign relations. Ad hoc diplomats—individuals chosen
exclusively by the president to complete limited and temporary
assignments—play a comparably significant role in addressing
international crises, negotiating treaties, and otherwise executing
foreign policy.
This Article critically examines the appointments process for such
irregular agents. An orthodox view holds it permissible for the
president to dispatch any ad hoc diplomat without Senate confirmation,
but this view does not accord with the original meaning of Article II.
Scrutinizing text and an extensive collection of original historical
sources, I show that, under a formalist reading of the Constitution, the
appointment of most ad hoc diplomats requires the advice and consent
of the Senate because these agents are typically “public Ministers” and
“Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause.
The analysis makes several contributions. First, it provides the first
thorough account of the original meaning of “public Ministers”—a
term that appears several times in the Constitution but lacks precise
contours in contemporary scholarship and practice. Second, for
formalists, the analysis reorients longstanding debates about the
process of treaty-making and empowers the Senate to exert greater
influence over a wide variety of presidential initiatives, including
communications with North Korea, the renegotiation of trade
agreements, the campaign to defeat ISIS, and the stabilization of
Ukraine, all of which have relied on the work of ad hoc diplomats. At
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a time of trepidation over the nature of U.S. foreign policy, such
influence might operate as a stabilizing force. Third, the analysis
illuminates rhetorical and doctrinal maneuvers that have facilitated the
rise of the modern presidency, including historical revisionism and the
marginalization of international law as an input in constitutional
interpretation. These maneuvers complicate the political valence of
originalism and cast the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC)—a key proponent of the orthodox view—as a motivated
expositor of the separation of powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern presidents rely on two classes of diplomats to conduct
foreign relations. One comprises individuals who occupy an office of
indefinite duration to handle a diverse range of assignments. The other
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consists of those who serve on a temporary basis to accomplish a
discrete task. The first class includes a global network of resident
ambassadors, ambassadors at large, Foreign Service officers, and
others within the State Department and several other federal agencies,
while the second involves individuals variously described as special
envoys, executive agents, and ad hoc diplomats. Both act for and
ultimately take orders from the president. Both can implicate the
United States under international principles of state responsibility.1
Both are entitled to diplomatic immunity under international law.2
And both carry out similar functions, including negotiating treaties,
attending official ceremonies and conferences, mediating foreign
conflicts, and otherwise serving as channels of communication on
matters of national concern.3
Consider a few examples. During World War II, President
Roosevelt designated Harry Hopkins, a special envoy, to act as his
personal representative in meetings with foreign leaders, report on
allied needs for military assistance, and participate in strategic talks at
the Tehran Conference of 1943,4 while in the 1960s, President Kennedy
assigned Averell Harriman, an ambassador at large, to act as a roving
emissary to Western European capitals, engage in fact-finding, and
serve as the U.S. representative to an international conference on the
status of Laos.5 In 1976, President Carter sent Ellsworth Bunker, an
ambassador at large, to negotiate the treaties under which the United
States eventually ceded control over the Panama Canal,6 while in 1981,

1. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 4, in
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (providing that a State organ “includes any person
or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State,” and that “[t]he
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law”).
2. Compare Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (establishing immunity from criminal jurisdiction and most types of civil
and administrative jurisdiction for heads of mission and members of a mission’s diplomatic staff),
with Convention on Special Missions art. 31, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (providing similar
immunities for “representatives of the sending State in the special mission and the members of its
diplomatic staff”).
3. Compare DENNIS C. JETT, AMERICAN AMBASSADORS: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DIPLOMATS 117–71 (2014) (describing the functions of ambassadors),
with HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
315–824 (1929) (documenting the practices of ad hoc diplomats in early U.S. history).
4. CHRISTOPHER D. O’SULLIVAN, HARRY HOPKINS: FDR’S ENVOY TO CHURCHILL AND
STALIN 75–124 (2015).
5. LEE H. BURKE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE: DIPLOMAT EXTRAORDINARY 61–69 (1972).
6. Talks Resumed by Bunker Over Panama Canal Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1976, at 8.
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President Reagan dispatched Philip Habib, a special envoy, to
negotiate an end to the Lebanese Civil War.7 Decades later, the Obama
Administration selected Barbara Weisel, an Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, to be its lead
interlocutor on the Trans-Pacific Partnership;8 assigned Todd Stern, a
special envoy, to be its chief negotiator on climate change;9 and
appointed Wendy Sherman as Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs,10 a position in which Sherman led the talks over the Iranian
nuclear program.11 Most recently, Donald Trump has relied upon Jared
Kushner, his son-in-law, to facilitate negotiations over peace in the
Middle East12 and tasked both Kushner and Robert Lighthizer, the
U.S. Trade Representative, with orchestrating a renegotiation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement.13 In these and other ways,
there is substantial functional overlap between the two classes.
The appointments process, however, differs markedly between
them. The president appoints “Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls” only “by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate,”14 but appoints ad hoc diplomats unilaterally. Thus, according
to what has become an orthodox view, the Senate can reject by a
simple-majority vote the president’s choices for posts such as

7. Bernard Gwertzman, A Special U.S. Envoy Will Go to Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1981,
at A1.
8. Barbara Weisel, ROCK CREEK GLOBAL ADVISORS LLC, http://www.rockcreek
advisors.com/barbara-weisel [https://perma.cc/BJ43-CSEX].
9. Kate Galbraith, Clinton Names Climate Envoy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/clinton-names-climate-envoy/?mtrref=undefined
[https://perma.cc/4CUN-9L2P].
10. 157 CONG. REC. 13,769 (2011).
11. See Jonathan Landay, Joseph Ax & Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, As Trump Leaves Iran
Deal, Families of Americans Jailed in Iran Urge Talks, REUTERS (May 9, 2018, 9:47 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-prisoners/as-trump-leaves-iran-deal-families-ofamericans-jailed-in-iran-urge-talks-idUSKBN1IB055 [https://perma.cc/KF45-NV6W].
12. See Annie Karni, Kushner in Middle East for Peace Talks, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2017, 8:15
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/22/kushner-in-middle-east-for-peace-talks-241895
[https://perma.cc/JN9N-HUNC].
13. See Don Lee, Senate Approval of Trump’s Trade Chief Could Speed Up NAFTA Talks,
L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-tradelighthizer-20170511-story.html# [https://perma.cc/3XFV-4CWL]; David Ljunggren & Steve
Holland, How Trump’s Son-in-law Helped Salvage the North American Trade Zone, REUTERS,
(Oct. 1, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-kushner-insight/howtrumps-son-in-law-helped-salvage-the-north-american-trade-zone-idUSKCN1MC04M [https://
perma.cc/Z9JL-M5YZ].
14. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ambassador at large,15 but plays no part in the appointment of irregular
agents.16 Returning to the examples above, the Senate had a role in the
appointments of Harriman, Bunker, Sherman, and Lighthizer, but not
Hopkins, Habib, Weisel, Stern, or Kushner. Is this constitutional?
A dearth of scholarship has obscured the significance of the
question. In the early twentieth century, ad hoc diplomacy attracted
attention from a small number of political scientists led by Henry
Wriston, who in 1929 published an eight-hundred-page tome that
revealed how early presidents had relied at times upon special envoys
instead of resident ambassadors for reasons of secrecy, informality,
speed, and aptitude.17 But much has happened in the past eighty-plus
years of U.S. foreign relations, and no other political scientists have
followed up with anything more than an occasional collection of
anecdotes.18 This has made it easier for presidents to pursue unilateral
appointments without scrutiny.
15. See 22 U.S.C. § 3942(a)(1) (2012) (“The President may, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoint an individual as a chief of mission, as an ambassador at large, as a
minister, as a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, or as a Foreign Service officer.”).
16. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31
Op. O.L.C. 73, 100–05 (2007) (suggesting this position).
17. See WRISTON, supra note 3; see generally MAURICE WATERS, THE AD HOC DIPLOMAT:
A STUDY IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963) (surveying the foreign policy practice
of presidential reliance on special executive agents in various aspects of foreign affairs); Maurice
Waters, The Ad Hoc Diplomat: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 380 (1960)
(examining the use of special executive agents and the practice’s legality); Maurice Waters,
Special Diplomatic Agents of the President, 307 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 124 (1956)
(investigating the presidential power to use special executive agents to carry out foreign
responsibilities without congressional restrictions) [hereinafter Waters, Special Diplomatic
Agents]; Henry Merritt Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 AM. J.
INT’L L. 33 (1926) (reviewing whether the President may legally send executive agents of any type
to international conferences without congressional approval); Henry Merritt Wriston,
Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy, 10 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481 (1916) (assessing the legal
and customary justifications for the employment of special executive agents in diplomacy); Henry
Merritt Wriston, The Special Envoy, 38 FOREIGN AFF. 219 (1960) (evaluating nearly unrestricted
presidential use of personal representatives abroad). Additional sources provide more limited
treatments. See BURKE, supra note 5, at 1–10 (positing “the Ambassador at Large as the personal
emissary of the President”); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A
STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 284–89
(1953) (observing that “the President is accorded wide discretion in the selection of persons to aid
him in the conduct of foreign relations”); ELMER PLISCHKE, SUMMIT DIPLOMACY: PERSONAL
DIPLOMACY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 41–51 (1958) (noting the “time-tried
aspect of summit diplomacy” in which “the President employs personal diplomatic
representatives to keep himself informed and to extend his personal influence and service
abroad”).
18. See generally Michael Fullilove, All the Presidents’ Men: The Role of Special Envoys in
U.S. Foreign Policy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 13 (2005) (discussing the use of special envoys in the Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations).
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Legal scholars, meanwhile, have offered little doctrinal clarity or
support. The ad hoc diplomat is the Appointments Clause analogue to
the so-called “sole executive agreement,” which is formed when the
president enters into a commitment with a foreign government without
the Senate’s advice and consent or other congressional approval. Both
constitute an unenumerated means by which the president
independently engages foreign sovereigns. But while sole executive
agreements have garnered substantial attention,19 few have
acknowledged unilateral diplomatic appointments, much less analyzed
their legality. Some commentators from the early twentieth century
asserted the president’s independent power to appoint special envoys
under the Article II Vesting Clause,20 the Treaty Clause,21 the Take
Care Clause,22 the Commander in Chief Clause,23 and the alleged
inapplicability of the Appointments Clause,24 but offered only limited
explanation. More recently, Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey
at least partly concurred in the orthodox view on originalist grounds,
but for them, ad hoc diplomacy was only a small piece of a broader
argument about the meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause, rather
than a target of sustained analysis.25

19. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1573 (2007) (contending that sole executive agreements must be adopted through either the
treaty-making or law-making process and that the Supremacy Clause does not allow the President
to override existing law); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power,
77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998) (asserting that while the president may lawfully enter minor executive
agreements in foreign affairs, the president must receive some form of congressional approval to
enter significant, binding international obligations or to alter domestic law); Ingrid Brunk
Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that judicial deference to sole executive agreements permitting the
president to terminate domestic litigation without congressional approval undermines the Treaty
and Supremacy Clauses).
20. See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 333
(1922).
21. BURKE, supra note 5, at 6.
22. See, e.g., Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125.
23. See, e.g., Francis N. Thorpe, Is the President of the United States Vested with Authority
Under the Constitution to Appoint a Special Diplomatic Agent with Paramount Power Without the
Advice and Consent of the Senate?, 42 AM. L. REG. & REV. 257, 261 (1894).
24. See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 17, at 127; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42 (2d ed. 1996) (“The constitutional requirement of Senate consent
was considered inapplicable because these agents, whatever they were called, were not appointed
to permanent ‘offices’, did not serve indefinitely, did not have emoluments of office (often not
even compensation), or perform duties prescribed by the Constitution or by Congress.”).
25. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 309–11 (2001).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

AD HOC DIPLOMATS

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

913

The result is that most contemporary observers and government
officials simply assume ad hoc diplomatic appointments of all kinds to
be permissible, and think about the constitutionality of international
treaties in particular as a simple function of contents and domestic
forms of adoption.26 Thus, some objected to the Trans-Pacific
Partnership on the view that it would have delegated to private
arbitrators adjudicative tasks that are the prerogative of Article III
courts,27 and the initial debate over the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change focused on whether the obligations arising from the treaty are
so substantial as to require some form of direct congressional
approval.28 Outside of the treaty context, some have objected, on
grounds of both nepotism and competence, to President Trump’s
decision to task his son-in-law with an assortment of diplomatic
assignments in the Middle East.29 In these and many other cases, it has
been taken as given that the unilateral process by which the president
appointed the negotiators was constitutional.
There are good reasons, however, to scrutinize such an
assumption. The modern executive branch relies upon ad hoc
diplomats frequently and to address a multitude of issues. In recent
years, presidents and secretaries of state have independently
dispatched agents to negotiate treaties such as the Paris Agreement;30

26. See generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000)
(arguing that federalism does not operate as a limit on the Article II power to make treaties);
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) (arguing that congressional-executive agreements
are a constitutional alternative to Article II treaties).
27. See Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, ATLANTIC (June
23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389
[https://perma.cc/F6RH-WJYS].
28. Compare Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements Plus, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 887, 916–19 (2016) (arguing that the Paris Agreement is constitutional as an
“executive agreement-plus,” a category of international agreement “supported but not
specifically authorized by congressional action”), with Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty
Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 384–87 (2016)
(tentatively concluding that the Agreement is unconstitutional as “an executive agreement (that
is, a binding nontreaty agreement)”).
29. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump’s Son-in-Law,
Jared Kushner, Tests Legal Path to White House Job, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/politics/donald-trump-administration.html?partner=
bloomberg [https://perma.cc/BP4A-N63R] (discussing nepotism objections to Kushner’s
appointment).
30. See Galbraith, supra note 9 (reporting Todd Stern’s appointment to lead U.S.
negotiations on climate change).
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promote peace in Sudan,31 the Great Lakes region of Africa,32
Northern Ireland,33 and the Middle East;34 advance a settlement on the
status of Kosovo;35 encourage dialogue between the United States and
Muslim countries;36 arrange for the resettlement of detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay;37 and reduce the threat posed by shoulder-launched
surface-to-air missiles,38 among many other reasons. Even under the
leadership of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who moved to
curtail U.S. reliance on special envoys,39 the Trump Administration
sent agents to renegotiate trade agreements,40 coordinate the military
campaign against the Islamic State,41 and address issues such as Russian
aggression in Ukraine.42 Further underscoring the significance of the
31. See Special Envoy Danforth Discusses Back-Channel Talks with Sant’egidio, Vatican FM,
WIKILEAKS (Dec. 27, 2001, 4:05 PM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/01VATICAN
6604_a.html [https://perma.cc/5MR6-G7L2].
32. See Great Lakes; SE Wolpe’s August 28 Consultations with the French, WIKILEAKS (Sept.
2, 2009, 8:37 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PARIS1198_a.html [https://perma.cc/
73XQ-GT4K].
33. See Northern Ireland Leaders Thank Special Envoy Dobriansky, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 13,
2009, 1:12 PM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BELFAST5_a.html [https://perma.cc/UB9RFVFU].
34. See Special Envoy Mitchell’s EU Meetings, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 27, 2009, 6:02 PM),
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS601_a.html [https://perma.cc/QF5D-TQ87].
35. See Special Envoy Wisner’s Visit to Belgrade, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 2, 2006, 3:50 PM),
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BELGRADE1810_a.html [https://perma.cc/XHK9-MVM8].
36. See Demarche: Announcing the U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC, WIKILEAKS (Feb. 29,
2008, 12:45 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE20672_a.html [https://perma.cc/
F8JJ-Z3Z2].
37. See Guantanamo: Special Envoy Fried and UNHCR on Next Steps for Resettling
Detainees, WIKILEAKS (May 20, 2009, 7:35 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/
09GENEVA383_a.html [https://perma.cc/4TGV-RE8A].
38. See Special Envoy for MANPADS – Indonesian Has Questions on Assistance,
WIKILEAKS (Mar. 28, 2008, 10:18 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08JAKART
A626_a.html [https://perma.cc/7K8K-6ART].
39. See Letter from Rex W. Tillerson, Sec’y of State, to the Hon. Bob Corker, Chairman,
Comm. on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Aug. 28, 2017, https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=0000015e-2b43-db52-a75e-ff7b3bfa0001
[https://perma.cc/S6D4-SRBZ]
(describing
Secretary Tillerson’s plan to integrate special envoys and special representatives into the State
Department bureaucracy and eliminate those that are no longer useful).
40. See generally Biographies of Key Officials, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/biographies-key-officials [https://perma.cc/J5ZAJYZU] (listing a number of negotiators appointed without the Senate’s advice and consent).
41. See Biography: Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/213058.htm
[https://perma.cc/LEP3-9XYB].
42. Josh Rogin, Inside the Trump Administration’s Plans to Restart the Ukraine
Peace Process, WASH. POST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/global-opinions/inside-the-trump-administrations-plans-to-restart-the-ukraine-peace-
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issue, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has expanded the use of special
envoys by dispatching agents to address some of the toughest
challenges in U.S. foreign policy, including Iran, North Korea, and
Syria.43
These appointments typically serve laudable purposes, but good
intentions do not necessarily make a practice lawful, and more is at
stake than the specific policies that animate each case. The
constitutionality of unilateral appointments determines whether the
Senate can vet envoys for competency and conflicts of interest. The
constitutionality of these appointments also affects the influence of the
traditional corps of resident ambassadors and Foreign Service officers.
It shapes the Senate’s ability to generate public discussion about and
express opposition toward executive policies. And in the event of
misconduct, it indirectly determines whether ad hoc diplomats are
impeachable as “civil Officers of the United States.”44 In short, a
constitution that requires Senate confirmation is one that subjects the
conduct of foreign relations to greater degrees of transparency,
deliberation, consensus building, and public accountability.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate the originalist case for
such a requirement.45 The Appointments Clause provides in part that
the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law.”46 The text thus suggests
that the requirement of advice and consent applies to a wide variety of
diplomats—not just ambassadors, but also “other public Ministers.”47
The orthodox view attempts to sidestep this language, asserting that ad
hoc agents are not “public Ministers” because they are not formally

process/2017/05/28/391da144-4234-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html [https://perma.cc/S76FVNM9].
43. Gardiner Harris, Special Envoys Were Once Disdained Under Trump. Now They’re
Popping Up All Over, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/world/
asia/pompeo-north-korea-envoy.html [https://perma.cc/U5HA-X4KC].
44. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
45. I am saving nontextual considerations for a separate, forthcoming article.
46. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
47. Id.
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accredited to represent the United States48 and lack tenure of office.49
As arguments about original meaning, however, these claims miss the
mark. Indeed, a wealth of original historical sources show that the
founders understood the law of nations as supplying the definition of
the term “public Ministers,” that this definition encompassed various
types of irregular envoys with statuses and functions equivalent to
those of contemporary ad hoc diplomats, and that one who qualified as
a public minister for the U.S. government under the law of nations was
necessarily a public minister and officer of the United States as a matter
of domestic constitutional law.
The issue is not merely of academic interest. In 2017, the Senate
briefly considered legislation to radically restrict the scope of the
president’s authority to make unilateral appointments.50 With only
limited exceptions, Section 301 of the Department of State Authorities
Act, Fiscal Year 2018 would have required the Senate’s advice and
consent for the appointment of “any Special Envoy, Special
Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy,
Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor.”51 This proposal lost
momentum after passing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
September of 2017, but members of Congress could revisit the idea in
the future.52 If and when they do, the constitutionality of unilateral
appointments will loom large. In demonstrating that ad hoc diplomats
are, as a matter of original meaning, principal officers under the
Appointments Clause, the present analysis provides a foundation for
statutory intervention.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the modern legal
position in favor of unilateral diplomatic appointments. Parts II and III
present the Article’s centerpiece: an originalist argument that the

48. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, 1 Op.
O.L.C. Supp. 457, 457 (1943).
49. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 100–05 (stating the orthodox view).
50. See All Information (Except Text) for S.1631 - Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal
Year 2018, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1631/allinfo?r=1 [https://perma.cc/9DVP-TBJG] (reporting the status of the bill).
51. Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018, S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 301(b)
(2017).
52. See Joshua Kurlantzick, How Will the Midterm Elections Affect U.S. Foreign Policy?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: ASIA UNBOUND (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-willmidterm-elections-affect-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/L5TY-JA9G] (predicting that
House Democrats “likely will try to get the State Department authorization bill passed,” but also
suggesting that passage is “a very unlikely prospect”).
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president lacks the power to appoint most ad hoc diplomats without
the Senate’s advice and consent. Part II performs a close reading of the
Constitution’s text to show that, while substantially indeterminate, the
text not only fails to require the orthodox view, but also provides
greater support for Senate involvement than executive unilateralism.
Part III then analyzes a large compilation of historical sources to
recover the original meaning of the Appointments Clause. These
sources—which include records from the Constitutional Convention
and state ratification debates, an early act of the British Parliament and
accompanying judicial precedents, eighteenth-century treatises on
diplomacy and international law, transcripts from congressional
debates, federal appointment and payroll records, and Founding-era
dictionaries—show that the framers treated many ad hoc diplomats,
including all of the principal U.S. negotiators of international
agreements, as public ministers and officers of the United States for
purposes of the Appointments Clause, without regard for tenure,
emoluments, or title. Part IV concludes by exploring the significance
of the analysis from both formalist and functionalist perspectives.
I. THE ORTHODOX DEFENSE OF UNILATERAL APPOINTMENTS
A modern view posits that the president holds power to appoint
all ad hoc diplomats without obtaining the Senate’s advice and
consent.53 There is no single official source that fully explains or
attempts to justify this view, but opinions from the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and a collection of
academic writing suggest that it rests on three major claims.
The first is the negative claim that the Appointments Clause does
not apply because ad hoc diplomats are neither “Officers of the United
States” nor “inferior” officers.54 In a 2007 opinion, OLC explained that
a federal office must (1) be “continuing” and (2) “involve[] a position
to which is delegated by legal authority a portion of the sovereign
powers of the federal Government.”55 A “continuing” position is “not
personal, ‘transient,’ or ‘incidental,’”56 and one that involves a

53. In most cases, this view is merely implicit. See generally, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18
(advocating greater presidential reliance on special envoys, without considering whether
unilateral appointments are consistent with Article II).
54. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 77.
56. Id. at 100.
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delegation of sovereign authority will possess “power lawfully
conferred by the government to bind third parties, or the government
itself, for the public benefit.”57 OLC’s stance is that ad hoc diplomats
are never officers because they fail to qualify under the first of these
criteria.58 Their positions, in other words, are not “continuing” because
they are “‘summoned into existence only for specific temporary
purposes.’”59 To justify this conclusion, OLC has cited evidence of
original meaning, opinions from prior Attorneys General, and case
law, the most important of which is the Supreme Court’s 1867 decision
in United States v. Hartwell,60 which did not address diplomatic
appointments but stated that “[a]n office is a public station, or
employment, conferred by the appointment of government” and
“embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”61 An
overwhelming majority of these authorities date back to the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
Decades before OLC, political scientist Henry Wriston reached
the same conclusion on the basis of original and early historical
practice.62 The essence of his claim was that ad hoc diplomats are not
officers because presidents since George Washington have consistently
and frequently appointed such agents on their own authority, and
because Congress has either acquiesced or opposed the practice on
grounds motivated by political disagreement rather than constitutional

57. Id. at 87.
58. In contrast, OLC does not appear to contest that ad hoc diplomats generally satisfy the
second criterion. According to the opinion, a position to which is delegated by legal authority a
portion of the “sovereign powers of the federal Government” is one conferring powers to “bind[]
the government or third parties for the benefit of the public,” including “the authority to represent
the United States to foreign nations.” Id. at 77. This definition would seem to include most ad hoc
diplomats.
59. Id. at 103 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 17891948, at 86 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis in original)).
60. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867).
61. Id. at 393; see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 139 (1996) (citing Hartwell as the source of the test for whether a
position is an office). The nonoriginalist merits of OLC’s position are also worth considering,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the
meaning of “Officers of the United States” for purposes of the Appointments Clause. See
generally Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that Administrative Law Judges at the
Securities and Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United States” because they occupy a
“continuing” position established by law and “exercise[e] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States”). I will address those merits in a separate article.
62. See generally WRISTON, supra note 3 (concluding, on the basis of historical practice and
congressional acquiescence, that ad hoc diplomacy is constitutional).
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principle.63 Wriston’s purpose was primarily descriptive, but he clearly
saw something pragmatic and salutary in the trends that had
developed. Special emissaries offered a calibrated means by which to
open relations, communicate with colonial and dependent states,
participate in international conferences, interface with unrecognized
regimes, and otherwise pursue objectives for which resident diplomats
are ill-suited.64
Several premises appear to underlie the first major claim. One is
that advice and consent are necessary only where an appointee will
qualify as both a “public Minister[]” and an “Officer[] of the United
States.”65 Another is that the criteria that determine whether an
appointee is a public minister are distinct from those that determine
whether she is an officer. Still another is that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hartwell supplies the proper test for determining officer
status.
As explained below,66 the first of these premises relies on the plain
language of the Appointments Clause. It is far from obvious, however,
that the others are justified, and for the most part those who espouse
the orthodox position do not acknowledge or attempt to justify them.
There is no significant scholarly analysis on the meaning of “public
Ministers,” for example, or whether it is warranted to treat officer
status as an independent precondition to the advice-and-consent
requirement, rather than as a simple consequence of an appointee’s
qualification as a public minister. As I will show, this leaves the first
major claim vulnerable in ways that the literature has failed to
recognize.
The second major claim is that the Appointments Clause is also
inapplicable insofar as ad hoc diplomats are neither “Ambassadors”
nor “public Ministers.”67 In a 1943 memorandum to the assistant
solicitor general, attorney-adviser W.H. Eberly explained that those
terms exclude “personal representatives of the President” and instead
refer to those who have been “formally accredited to . . . foreign
governments as official diplomatic representatives of our
government.”68 This position would not excuse the unilateral

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 315–837.
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See infra Part II.A.
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

920

[Vol. 68:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

appointment of treaty negotiators or others who exercise
governmental authority, but would exempt certain types of informal,
non- or quasi-official appointments from the requirement of advice and
consent. As justification, Eberly pointed to influential treatises by
Green Haywood Hackworth and John Bassett Moore,69 the relevant
portions of which reported a handful of unilateral appointments from
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.70 OLC has never cited the
Eberly memorandum in a published opinion, but its central conclusion
is likely to continue to reflect the position of the executive branch.71
The final major claim is that parts of Article II other than the
Appointments Clause supply the president with power to appoint ad
hoc diplomats on his own authority. Commentators have identified a
number of candidates. Edward Corwin and Quincy Wright emphasized
the Article II Vesting Clause.72 Wriston invoked the Treaty Clause on
the view that the power to “make Treaties” implies the power to select
and dispatch those who would negotiate them.73 Maurice Waters
pointed to the Take Care Clause.74 One nineteenth-century
commentator highlighted the Commander in Chief Clause, contending
that it empowers the president “to send special agents to any part of
the world to make investigation . . . touching matters pending, or likely
to be pending, between the United States and another country or
people.”75
OLC has not directly weighed in on the final major claim, but its
opinions endorse broad and exclusive executive authority over the
conduct of foreign relations, including the selection of those who will
represent the United States abroad. In a 2009 opinion reviewing a
statute that purported to block the president from using appropriated
funds to pay expenses for delegations to any U.N. body chaired by a
state sponsor of terrorism, OLC stated that Congress lacks “authority
note 48, at 457.
69. Id. at 457–59.
70. 4 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412–14 (1942); 4
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 452–57 (1906).
71. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1448, 1481 tbl.1 (2010) (reporting evidence that OLC rarely modifies or overrules prior
opinions).
72. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 207 (4th ed. 1957);
WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 333. As explained earlier, the same appears to be true of Prakash and
Ramsey. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
73. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 126–27.
74. Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125.
75. Thorpe, supra note 23, at 261.
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to attempt to dictate the modes and means by which the President
engages in international diplomacy with foreign countries and through
international fora,” and concluded that the statute in question was
unconstitutional because it denied the president “the use of his
preferred agents.”76 Two years later, OLC reiterated that the
president’s diplomacy power includes “exclusive authority to
determine . . . the individuals who will represent the United States” in
international negotiations.77 These opinions cited to virtually every
part of Article II that implicates foreign relations and suggest that OLC
would affirm the president’s independent authority to appoint all
varieties of special envoys on similar grounds.78 As I will show, such a
position is at odds with original meaning.
II. INSIGHTS FROM TEXT
To evaluate the merits of the orthodox position, I begin by closely
scrutinizing the text of Article II, which contains all of the alleged
foundations for unilateral appointments. On its own, this text is in
many respects indeterminate. But to the extent that it offers any insight
at all, the text offers stronger support for the view that unilateral
appointments are impermissible.
A. The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause states in part that the president “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
76. Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33
Op. O.L.C., at 4 (June 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/file/18496/download [https://
perma.cc/4XW5-ZHWE].
77. Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C., at 4 (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
file/18346/download [https://perma.cc/9MVF-7G4G] (citation omitted).
78. See Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations
Act, supra note 76, at 4; Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, supra note 77, at 4 & n.1. From the standpoint of a neutral interpreter,
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry complicates the matter insofar as it
rejected the view that the president has “exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations” and
“the bulk of foreign-affairs powers.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86, 2089 (2015)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). It is likely, however, that the executive branch will
“read [Zivotofsky II] generously in favor of the President in resolving everyday foreign policy
disputes between the political branches.” Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the
Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112, 114 (2015).
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the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law.”79 Plainly, there is no plausible argument that
ad hoc diplomats qualify as “Judges of the supreme Court.”80 Nor is
there a persuasive argument that they qualify as “Consuls,” who have
long executed nondiplomatic functions, such as providing overseas
assistance to American citizens, issuing passports, and acting as
notaries.81 Thus, the central question is whether ad hoc diplomats fall
into any of the remaining categories: “Ambassadors,” “other public
Ministers,” or “other Officers of the United States.”82 It can be
constitutional for the president to proceed without Senate approval
only if special envoys are none of these.83
A few modest observations at the outset: First, public ministers
are those who will carry out international diplomatic functions. The
phrase “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” implies as
much by identifying public ministers as a category that includes
“ambassadors,” who, according to contemporary and historical
understanding, officially represent the United States in foreign
affairs.84 This limitation is transparent to contemporary readers but
nevertheless significant because the term “public minister” has in the
past carried an additional meaning that does not concern foreign

79. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
80. Id.
81. See CHARLES STUART KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN CONSUL: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSULAR SERVICE, 1776–1914, at 19–28 (1990) (describing the work of early
American consuls); see also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 229–30, 573–83 (Joseph
Chitty ed. & trans., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758) (distinguishing consuls
from public ministers and describing their respective functions). For a more recent definition of
consular functions, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (enumerating consular functions under modern international law).
82. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
83. The Appointments Clause also provides that “Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. As explained below, this language is not directly
relevant because it is unlikely that a public minister could qualify as an inferior officer. See infra
note 87 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., ABRAHAM DE WICQUEFORT, THE EMBASSADOR AND HIS FUNCTIONS 1–6
(Digby trans., London, Bernard Lintott 1716) (discussing the historical functions of ambassadors);
AM. ACAD. OF DIPLOMACY, FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: AMBASSADORS, EMBASSIES AND
AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD 1–14 (Robert V. Keeley ed., 2000) (discussing the modern
functions of American ambassadors); see also Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of the
United States, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 186 (1856) (“The expression ‘ambassadors and other public
ministers,’ which occurs three times in the Constitution, must be understood as comprehending
all officers having diplomatic functions, whatever their title or designation.”).
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relations.85 Second, the public ministers whose appointments require
Senate confirmation are those who will be “Officers of the United
States.”86 And third, there are no other restrictions on the objects of
the confirmation requirement, the effect being that advice and consent
is necessary for the appointment of all ambassadors and all other public
ministers who will be officers of the United States.87 This conclusion is
consistent with the longstanding interpretation of the adjacent
reference to “Judges of the supreme Court,” which requires Senate
confirmation for the appointment of all U.S. Supreme Court Justices.88
More significantly, other references to “public Ministers” suggest
that the term includes many ad hoc diplomats. The Article II
Reception Clause provides that the president “shall receive

85. Cf. Public Minister, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 2007),
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/265959?
[https://perma.cc/4PP7-GHEN]
(identifying one definition of “public minister” that dates to at least 1564 as “[a] religious official
who works in a public capacity”).
86. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It is conceivable that neither “Ambassadors” nor “other
public Ministers” are “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause, but this
reading seems unlikely, given the Clause’s internal structure. The text enumerates only four
specific categories of appointees—“[1] Ambassadors, [2] other public Ministers and [3] Consuls”
and “[4] Judges of the supreme Court.” Id. Moreover, the text lists those four categories in
immediate succession and links the first two by identifying one as a subcategory of the other. Id.
These conditions seem to limit the plausibility of differential status; if public ministers are not
officers, then the same is almost certainly true of ambassadors, and most likely true of consuls and
Supreme Court justices as well. Yet this would mean that the phrase “and all other Officers of the
United States” appears at the end of a list composed exclusively of non-officers. See id. To the
modern reader, such phrasing would seem to contradict the implication of the word “other,”
which is that at least some of the enumerated categories of appointees are illustrative of “Officers
of the United States.” It would be akin to saying something like, “the United States, other
Western countries and Japan, South Africa, and all other fruit,” to name just one example. More
importantly for present purposes, such an interpretation appears to have been rejected at the
Founding. See, e.g., Letter from Charles Thomson to George Washington (May 19, 1789), in 2
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 335 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987)
(“It appears that ambassadors, other public minister and consuls, and judges of the Supreme court
are on the same footing, that is officers recognised by the Constitution & the existence of whose
offices does not depend on, or require a law for their establishment . . . .”).
87. The Appointments Clause also states that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.” U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This raises the question of whether it
is possible for a public minister to qualify not as a principal officer, but rather as an “inferior
Officer[]” to whom the hurdle of advice and consent does not apply. Id. The answer seems to be
no—the Constitution appears to foreclose such a possibility by referring to public ministers
exclusively and without qualification as “Officers of the United States.” Id. This language would
be strange and misleading if a material portion of those who comprise the category of public
ministers qualify as something else entirely.
88. Id.
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Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”89 while Article III
establishes both that the judicial power shall extend to “all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” and that
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in such cases.90
Given identical terminology and capitalization, along with similar
phrasing, it is reasonable to think that these clauses all reflect the same
conception of “public Ministers.”91 Thus, if the term were to exclude
all ad hoc diplomats in the context of the Appointments Clause, it
should do likewise in the context of the Reception Clause and Article
III.
Such an exclusion, however, would seem to demand nonsensical
results. With respect to the Reception Clause, it would require either
that the president lacks power to receive irregular agents from foreign
governments, or that another part of Article II—most likely the
Vesting Clause—operates as the source of that power.92 Given that the
president’s reception power is indisputably exclusive of Congress and
the judiciary,93 the first option would mean that no branch of the
federal government can lawfully receive irregular diplomatic agents,
even though such agents are a longstanding feature of U.S. foreign
relations and in many ways functionally identical to resident
diplomats.94 The second option, meanwhile, would require that the
source of the power to receive irregular agents either overlaps with the
Reception Clause itself or picks up precisely where the Clause leaves
off. The overlap scenario would render the Reception Clause
superfluous and contradict a general presumption against
redundancy.95 The other scenario is simply counterintuitive, finding
89. Id. art. II, § 3.
90. Id. art. III, § 2.
91. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789, 792–94 (1999)
(arguing that “strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive) argument for parallel
interpretation”).
92. See generally Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25 (articulating the Vesting Clause thesis).
93. Congress has permitted over one hundred foreign leaders and dignitaries to deliver
official addresses to its membership since 1874, Foreign Leaders and Dignitaries Who Have
Addressed the U.S. Congress: Fast Facts, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFF. OF THE
HISTORIAN, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Foreign-Leaders/Fast-Facts [https://perma.cc/
LLQ2-FTGG], but most view this practice as compatible with the president’s exclusive authority
under the Reception Clause because it does not entail a formal acceptance of diplomatic
credentials or operate as an official means of recognizing a foreign state or government. Cf.
Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of Executive
Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 812–16 (2011) (analyzing the meaning of the Reception Clause).
94. See infra Part III (discussing historical usage and functions).
95. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
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reception power only by reaching beyond the one part of the
Constitution that explicitly addresses reception.
The categorical exclusion of ad hoc diplomats from the concept of
public ministers would be equally problematic for Article III, as it
would create a significant disparity in treatment for functionally similar
foreign agents. On one hand, Article III would be extremely solicitous
of foreign diplomats resident in the United States, providing not only
a separate head of federal jurisdiction for cases that affect them, but
also exclusive and original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for suits
in which they are defendants and concurrent and original jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court for suits in which they are plaintiffs.96 On the
other hand, Article III would be entirely indifferent to irregular
diplomatic agents, declining to provide both a separate head of federal
jurisdiction and a basis for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
for cases that affect them. This would force ad hoc diplomats to either
find a different source of jurisdiction in the lower courts or fend for
themselves in state courts. The logic of such differential treatment is
hard to imagine, and appears contrary to original intent. In the Virginia
ratification debates, for example, Edmund Randolph explained that
the purpose of granting federal jurisdiction over cases affecting public
ministers was to “perpetuate harmony between [the United States] and
foreign powers” and ensure that the federal government “judges how
the United States can be most effectually secured and guarded against
controversies with foreign nations.”97 The potential absence of federal
jurisdiction over many cases affecting irregular envoys from foreign
governments would disserve this purpose.

Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 555 (2004) (making this argument in response to the Vesting
Clause thesis).
96. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (providing
that the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over “suits or proceedings
against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court
of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations,” and providing “original, but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers”); see also
Börs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 256–57 (1884) (according “great weight” to the Judiciary Act of
1789 as a guide to the meaning of Article III in cases affecting representatives of foreign
governments). Since 1978, original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is available but no longer
exclusive, at least as a matter of statutory law, in cases against ambassadors and other public
ministers. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8(b), 92 Stat. 808, 810 (1978) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). But needless to say, this reform is not evidence of original meaning.
97. The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 21, 1788), in 3
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 570 (photo. reprint 1937) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES].
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To be sure, it is possible for a single term to carry more than one
meaning within the four corners of the Constitution. In District of
Columbia v. Heller,98 for instance, the Supreme Court interpreted
“State,” which appears numerous times throughout the structural
articles and the Bill of Rights, to mean “polity” in the context of the
Second Amendment, even though the word otherwise refers to the fifty
states.99 But the conditions that justified such differentiation do not
manifest in relation to “public Ministers.” Unlike “State” and other
terms that might reasonably vary in denotation throughout the
Constitution, the multiple references to “public Ministers” exhibit
remarkable uniformity. They are never accompanied by unique
modifiers.100 They always use the same capitalization. They always
appear immediately after “Ambassadors” and typically precede a
reference to “Consuls.” These similarities exist, moreover, even
though “public Ministers” appears twice in both Article II and Article
III. Such conditions strongly suggest that “public Ministers” is a term
of art with a distinct and—critically—singular meaning. To avoid
serious difficulties under the Reception Clause and Article III, this
meaning must encompass ad hoc diplomats.
A remaining issue concerns the relationship between public
minister status and officer status. There are two possibilities here. One
is that “Officers of the United States” circumscribes “public
Ministers,” such that advice and consent is necessary only if the
nominee would, upon assuming his or her official functions, satisfy
criteria that comprise the general category of officers of the United
States in addition to separate and independent criteria comprising the
specific category of public ministers. Alternatively, it is possible that
one who is a public minister—however that term is defined—is
necessarily an officer of the United States, such that the general
definition of “Officer” supplies no additional limiting conditions. The
first view treats officer status as an independent requirement, while the
second treats it as a simple consequence. As explained above,101 the
orthodox position favors the former, but that is not obviously correct
as a textual matter. Merely identifying public ministers as officers of
98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
99. Id. at 597.
100. Cf. id. (adopting a unique definition of “State” for purposes of the Second Amendment
in part because “the other instances of ‘state’ in the Constitution are typically accompanied by
modifiers making clear that the reference is to the several States—‘each state,’ ‘several states,’
‘any state,’ ‘that state,’ ‘particular states,’ ‘one state,’ ‘no state’”).
101. See supra Part I.
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the United States does not explain what makes them so, and one can
easily imagine verbal formulations different from the Appointments
Clause that would have offered stronger support.
The Appointments Clause thus presents a problem for the
practice of unilateral ad hoc diplomacy. The orthodox view is
justifiable on textual grounds only if either of two propositions holds
true: (1) the term “public Ministers” excludes all ad hoc diplomats or
(2) officer status is a separate and independent requirement, the
satisfaction of which hinges on criteria that categorically exclude ad
hoc diplomats. The first proposition would have deeply troubling
consequences for the Reception Clause and Article III, while the
second lacks affirmative support. In fairness, the plain language of the
Appointments Clause also fails to provide conclusive evidence that
unilateral diplomatic appointments are unlawful. But neither does the
text require unilateralism, and this is a key insight, not only because it
calls into question the legal necessity of contemporary practice, but
also because it calls for historical inquiry as a means of understanding
the rule. The evidence of original meaning, as I will show in Part III,
strongly favors Senate participation.
B. The Rest of Article II
Of course, the orthodox position does not rely exclusively on the
alleged inapplicability of the Appointments Clause; commentators
have attempted to identify an affirmative foundation for unilateral
diplomatic appointments in the Treaty Clause, the Take Care Clause,
the Commander in Chief Clause, the Reception Clause, and the Article
II Vesting Clause.102 Yet these arguments each encounter serious
difficulties of their own.
The Treaty Clause is problematic for several reasons. One is that
it does not grant the power to make treaties to the president alone.
Unlike the Appointments Clause, which explicitly divides the
appointment power into distinct stages of nomination followed by
advice and consent103 and allocates control over the first stage
exclusively to the president,104 the Treaty Clause grants no power
exclusively to the president—the full power to “make Treaties” exists

102. See supra notes 20–24.
103. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls . . . .”).
104. Id.
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only “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”105 This is a
strange foundation for a power belonging to the president alone. It is
also underinclusive, given that treaty negotiations are at most a subset
of the broader practice of ad hoc diplomacy.106
The Take Care Clause fares no better. In the 1950s, political
scientist Maurice Waters argued “that the separation-of-powers
concept implies that each branch has an inherent right to appoint its
subordinates,” and that “[i]n the case of the executive this right is
reinforced by the fact that the appointing power results from the
obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed.”107 But this
proves far too much. If the separation of powers and the Take Care
Clause gave the president an inherent right to appoint any
subordinates, including all those involved in diplomacy, the
Appointments Clause would be a dead letter as to all appointments to
offices in the executive branch. In addition, there are many cases where
presidents use ad hoc diplomats for purposes other than law
execution.108 When the president dispatches a special envoy to attend
an international conference or negotiate an agreement, the agent may
act in furtherance of little more than executive policy. The Take Care
Clause appears inapplicable in such circumstances.
Next consider the Commander in Chief Clause. One nineteenthcentury commentator argued that it empowers the president “to send

105. Id. (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
106. As another argument, some have suggested that, far from authorizing unilateral
appointments, the Treaty Clause requires two-thirds approval from the Senate for the
appointment of treaty negotiators. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 719 (1789) (Gales & Seator eds.,
1849) (Statement of Rep. Tucker). On this view, the Clause envisions advice and consent as a set
of at least two discrete approvals, with one applying to the appointment of the negotiator(s) and
another applying later to the completed text, rather than as a single act of comprehensive, ex post
endorsement. But there are serious problems with this interpretation. First, it would seem to make
it harder to appoint treaty negotiators than Supreme Court Justices, whose appointments require
only a simple majority. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two thirds of Senators present
to concur when giving “Advice and Consent” for the president to make a treaty but not when
giving “Advice and Consent” for presidential appointments to the Supreme Court). This seems
odd in light of the relative significance of the two offices, at least by contemporary standards.
Second, it would contradict the Appointments Clause, which requires only a simple majority of
the Senate to approve the appointment of treaty negotiators qua “public Ministers.” See infra Part
III.
107. Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125.
108. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not
go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his
power.” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 295 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
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special agents to any part of the world to make
investigation . . . touching matters pending, or likely to be pending,
between the United States and another country or people.”109 This
position also appears to stretch the text to an implausible breadth. As
David Barron and Martin Lederman have argued, the best reading of
the Clause treats it as a grant of power to superintend the armed forces
and make decisions concerning the conduct of military operations.110 It
appears that most ad hoc diplomats have not been members of the
military, and from an organizational perspective, it is doubtful that the
president’s position at the pinnacle of the military command structure
can justify the unilateral use of diplomatic agents of a nonmartial
character.111
One might further imagine the Reception Clause as offering
support for unilateral appointments by identifying the president as a
central actor in the conduct of foreign relations, but again there are
major complications: The Clause does not discuss appointments, it
provides for a presidential duty rather than a power, and it was
famously described by Alexander Hamilton as “more a matter of
dignity than of authority” and one “without consequence in the
administration of the government.”112 Even if one reads the Clause
generously as a source of executive power to conduct foreign relations,
it does not necessarily follow that the president wields independent
authority to choose the agents on whom he will rely.
The final asserted basis for unilateral diplomatic appointments is
the Article II Vesting Clause. A number of influential commentators
have argued that the reference to “executive power” in Article II,
Section 1 grants a “residual” foreign affairs power to the president, and
that this power includes a subsidiary power to dispatch irregular envoys
without the Senate’s advice and consent.113 The most thorough
exposition of this claim relies primarily on eighteenth-century sources
109. Thorpe, supra note 23, at 261.
110. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb:
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 767–70
(2008).
111. Some special envoys have military backgrounds, but most do not. See, e.g., US Special
Envoy for Countering PKK in Baghdad, Discusses Makhmour Camp Closure, WIKILEAKS (Oct.
22, 2006, 7:23 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BAGHDAD3957a.html [https://
perma.cc/4MA6-SWFY] (reporting on the work of General Joseph Ralston, U.S. Special Envoy
for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and former Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff).
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
113. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 234, 303–04, 309–10.

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

930

[Vol. 68:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

that appear to have treated foreign affairs as a domain of executive
power.114 The Vesting Clause argument is perhaps the most plausible
of the traditional justifications for ad hoc diplomacy, but it, too,
founders under scrutiny.
Two problems stand out. One is that, by its own terms, the
argument only identifies the source of residual powers that lie beyond
the scope of other enumerations.115 This leaves unanswered the far
more targeted question about the meaning of the Appointments
Clause, which exhibits the most obvious connection to the issue of
special envoys. Put differently, there is no reason even to consider the
Vesting Clause if the Appointments Clause addresses the issue of ad
hoc appointments. The other problem is that, as demonstrated
below,116 the founders understood many irregular diplomatic agents as
public ministers and officers of the United States, and thus as subject
to the requirement of Senate confirmation. However broad the
president’s control over foreign affairs, it is apparent—clear, even—
that the founders generally treated this issue as one of shared authority.
In summary, the text of the Constitution does not support the
orthodox view. The Appointments Clause does not define “public
Ministers” to categorically exclude irregular diplomatic agents. Nor
does it dictate that qualification as an officer of the United States is an
independent precondition to the need for Senate confirmation, rather
than a consequence of qualification as a public minister. Indeed,
cognate language seems to suggest that the term “public Ministers”
encompasses many irregular envoys, and it is plausible that
qualification as a public minister constitutes an envoy as an officer of
the United States. Other provisions in Article II, meanwhile, fail to
provide affirmative support for unilateral appointments.
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “PUBLIC MINISTERS”
Perhaps because text alone supplies so little support, advocates of
the orthodox view have relied in substantial part on evidence of
original meaning. Wriston, for example, devoted the first chapter of his
book to an analysis of the Constitutional Convention, state ratification

114. See id. at 265–355 (discussing supporting evidence from eighteenth-century political
theory, the Continental Congress, the Philadelphia Convention, the ratification debates, and the
Washington Administration).
115. See id. at 234 (arguing that the source of the president’s residual foreign affairs powers is
the Vesting Clause).
116. See infra Part III.
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debates, and early practices of the Washington Administration,
concluding that “Washington found a tradition, though not very firmly
rooted, of employing private persons for confidential business in
foreign affairs,” and that “the matter of instruction and negotiation
became more and more exclusively presidential” over time.117 Given
these developments, Wriston found it only natural that “the agents
used [for diplomatic matters] became more and more presidential, as
well.”118 Similarly, OLC cited diplomatic practice from the
administrations of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson to justify
the conclusion that “a position must have continuance or duration” in
order to constitute “an office [of the United States]” under the
Appointments Clause.119
Yet these conclusions either misinterpret or overlook a significant
volume of relevant evidence. In this Part, I marshal that evidence to
show that, far from favoring unilateral ad hoc diplomacy, the original
meaning of the Constitution generally disfavors the practice.
Specifically, the framers understood the term “public Minister[]”
exclusively by reference to the law of nations, and as denoting any
diplomatic agent who officially and publicly represents a sovereign
state in foreign affairs, without regard for the duration of the position,
emoluments, or title. This definition excluded consuls, diplomatic
agents whose official roles were known to receiving governments but
hidden from the public at large, and individuals dispatched in wholly
unofficial capacities, but it included a wide range of irregular
diplomats, such as treaty negotiators, attendees at official ceremonies,
many international messengers, and even members of multinational
arbitral tribunals. Moreover, the founders viewed Senate confirmation
as necessary for the appointment of anyone who satisfied this
definition. In doing so, they appear to have operated on the premise
that one who qualifies as a public minister for the U.S. government
under the law of nations is necessarily a public minister and officer of
the United States as a matter of domestic constitutional law.
A. Constitutional Convention and Ratification Debates
Records from the Constitutional Convention and state ratification
debates show that the appointment power was one of considerable
117. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 104–05.
118. Id. at 105.
119. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 102.
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interest and deliberation. The topic arose on multiple occasions,
attracted commentary from a diverse cast of participants, and
generated divergent proposals. Yet the overwhelming focus of
discussion and source of disagreement was simply allocation.120 James
Madison proposed an executive power “to appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for.”121 Alexander Hamilton’s plan granted the
executive power over the “appointment of the heads or chief officers
of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs” and power to
nominate “all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations
included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate.”122
Charles Pinckney’s draft authorized the Senate alone “to appoint
Ambassadors & other Ministers to Foreign nations & Judges of the
Supreme Court.”123
These diverse proposals reflected a common belief that the locus
of the appointment power was an issue of significance, capable of
shaping the quality of the appointments themselves, public
accountability, federal policymaking, and the relative influence of
small and large states. In defending the Convention’s decision to divide
the power between the president and the Senate, Hamilton argued that
executive control over nominations was optimal because “one man of
discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar
qualities adapted to particular offices,” and because “[t]he sole and
undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense
of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”124 The requirement of
Senate advice and consent, meanwhile, “would be an excellent check
upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to
prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity.”125

120. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 16–29 (2003) (summarizing the drafting process
and public discussion of the Appointments Clause at the Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION 221–24 (2016) (discussing various proposals for allocation of the
appointment power and corresponding arguments).
121. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 63 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(statement of James Madison) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
122. 1 id. at 292 (statement of Alexander Hamilton).
123. 3 id. at 599 (statement of Charles Pinckney).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 112, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton).
125. Id. at 457.
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The narrower issue of diplomatic appointments garnered far less
attention, perhaps, as one historian has argued, because the framers
assumed they would be infrequent.126 But the sources still support a few
inferences. First, drafters appear to have believed that the text of the
Articles of Confederation, which referred only to the sending of
“ambassadors,” had been too limited.127 A mid-summer report from
the Committee of Detail utilized similar language,128 but later drafts
referred to ambassadors “and other public ministers”129 and, finally,
“Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”130 In The
Federalist, James Madison explained the rationale for this shift, stating
that the “power of appointing and receiving ‘other public Ministers and
Consuls’ [was] expressly and very properly added to the former
provision concerning ambassadors” because “[t]he term ambassador,
if taken strictly . . . comprehends the highest grade only of public
ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most
likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary.”131 On this
account, ambassadors were understood to be the highest-ranking type
of public minister, and one purpose of the Appointments Clause was
to clarify the authority of the president and Senate to appoint
diplomatic agents of lower status.
Second, some viewed diplomatic appointments in particular as a
topic of concern. In 1783, as delegates to the Congress of the
Confederation, Daniel Carroll and Hugh Williamson sponsored a
motion that “no public minister should be employed by the United
States, except on extraordinary occasions,” the justification being that
such a measure “would not only be economical, but would withhold
our distinguished citizens from the corrupting scenes at foreign courts,
and, . . . prevent the residence of foreign ministers in the United States,
whose intrigues and examples might be injurious both to the

126. See FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 155, 160 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1986) (1973) (explaining that
“there was a minimum of floor debate on the diplomatic powers” and that delegates to the
Convention “assumed that diplomatic negotiations per se would be rare, that foreign relations
would be commercial in nature, and that treaties would be few”).
127. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (“The United States in Congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power . . . of sending and receiving
ambassadors . . . .”).
128. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 183 (motion of August 6, 1787).
129. 2 id. at 383 (motion of August 23, 1787).
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 112, at 264–65 (James Madison).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

934

[Vol. 68:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

government and the people.”132 Congress adjourned before deciding
the motion, but both Carroll and Williamson attended the
Constitutional Convention and later campaigned for ratification in
their respective home states of Maryland and North Carolina.133 Their
views on constitutional issues, in other words, appear to have been
fairly mainstream. Likewise, Elbridge Gerry opposed the Pinckney
Plan on the ground that exclusive Senate control over diplomatic
appointments would lead to an unwarranted proliferation of agents
overseas and undue foreign influence.134 In his assessment, “few [public
ministers] were necessary,” and it was “the opinion of a great many
that they ought to be discontinued” in order to control costs and
foreclose the reciprocal admission of foreign agents to the United
States.135 Contemporaries such as Francis Dana, Albert Gallatin,
George Mason, Charles Pinckney, and Thomas Jefferson seem to have
more or less agreed.136 Their concerns echoed the ideas of the
philosophes, a group of eighteenth-century public intellectuals who
assailed classical diplomacy as a source of duplicity, corruption,
secrecy, foreign entanglement, and war.137 The philosophes envisioned
132. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (May 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 97, at 90.
133. The Founding Fathers: Maryland, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/founding-fathers-maryland [https://perma.cc/DK8P-KZGP]; The Founding Fathers: North
Carolina, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers-northcarolina [https://perma.cc/H7XF-4R57].
134. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 285 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
135. Id.
136. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 859 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (expressing a desire to
phase out contacts with European powers over time); 7 id. at 866 (1786) (statement of Rep.
Pinckney) (“[I]t would appear to be for our interest to have as little political connexion with
Europe as possible, and therefore Ministers could be of no use, but might do mischief.”); 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 438 (statement of George Mason) (characterizing
ambassadorial appointments as sinecures for domestic political allies); Letter from Francis Dana
to John Adams (Jan. 30, 1785), in 16 THE ADAMS PAPERS, PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: FEBRUARY
1784–MARCH 1785, at 500–05 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]here is nothing clearer in my
opinion than that our Interests will be more injured by the residence of foreign Ministers among
us, than they be promoted by our Ministers abroad. The best way to get rid of the former is not
to send out the latter.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short on Mr. & Mrs. Merry
(Jan. 23, 1804), in 33 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 833 (1928) (characterizing classical
diplomacy as “the pest of peace” and “the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are
manufactured”). For a discussion on the various concerns that fueled debate over the
maintenance of diplomatic relations, see generally WARREN FREDERICK ILCHMAN,
PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED STATES 1779–1939: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY 18–40 (1961).
137. See FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 54–66 (1961) (explaining the positions of the philosophes on diplomacy and
foreign affairs); see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
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a world largely without diplomats, with countries linked by commerce
rather than political alliances and the balance of power,138 and for those
who shared this vision,139 the power to appoint public ministers would
be one to wield with caution, if at all.
Finally, the framers appear to have taken for granted the meaning
of the term “public minister,” which had been in use for well over a
century prior to the adoption of the Constitution, including in
America.140 During the South Carolina ratification debates, for
example, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney referred to the diplomatic
agents who had served under the Congress of the Confederation as
“public ministers.”141 John Adams and Robert Morris, among others,
engaged in similar usage in early correspondence,142 and many
employed the term interchangeably with “ministers.”143 No one
appears to have debated or questioned the term’s meaning.
341, 361–62 (2009) (discussing the Framers’ fear of being corrupted by foreign powers and how
this fear inspired the adoption of the Foreign Emoluments Clause). But see Seth Barrett Tillman,
Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 399, 404–06 (2012) (arguing that Teachout overstates the extent of the original concern for
corruption).
138. GILBERT, supra note 137, at 62–66.
139. Most historians take the position that the philosophes influenced many of the Framers,
at least during the early years of the Revolution. See id. at 69 (identifying a “close connection
between the ideas of the philosophes and American foreign policy” in the early Revolutionary
Period); LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, COLONIES INTO NATION: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1763–1801,
at 93 (1972) (“The appeal of the ideas of Europe’s philosophes was natural for Americans.”). But
see James H. Hutson, Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy, 1 DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY 1, 18 (1977) (arguing that the philosophes did not influence the Founders, and that
“American leaders operated in foreign politics according to the assumptions of power politics that
dominated contemporary European statecraft”).
140. See Public Minister, supra note 85 (citing a 1624 proclamation from King James I, who
discussed “the great priviledges, which by the Laws of God and Nations are attributed unto the
persons of Ambassadors, Agents, and public Ministers of foreign Princes and States”) (spelling
modified from original).
141. The Debates in the Convention of the State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1778), in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 282.
142. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (May 21, 1778), in 2
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 591–93 (Francis
Wharton ed., 1889) (referring to U.S. commissioners in France as “public ministers”); Letter from
Robert Morris to Benjamin Franklin (Sept. 30, 1782), in 5 id. at 788 (referring to American
diplomats in Europe as “our public ministers in Europe”). For other examples, see Letter from
Silas Deane to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1778), in 2 id. at 739–40; Statement of William
Paca & William Henry Dayton to Congress (Apr. 30, 1779), as to Arthur Lee, in 3 id. at 147;
Letter from Francis Dana to Robert Livingston (Sept. 5, 1782), in 5 id. at 700.
143. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the State of Maryland (Apr. 21, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 550 (reporting a proposed amendment “that no person be
exempt from such jurisdiction and trial but ambassadors and ministers privileged by the law of
nations”).
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But what was that meaning? And more specifically, did it
encompass any ad hoc diplomats, or was it confined to those appointed
to fill an office that exists indefinitely, such as that of a resident
ambassador? The records from the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution provide virtually no insight on this central question. In
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued that original jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court is important for cases affecting public ministers
because “[p]ublic ministers of every class are the immediate
representatives of their sovereigns.”144 Yet, from this brief statement
alone, much remains unclear.
As the following sections will show, other sources are more
helpful. In particular, histories of the foreign relations of European
states, eighteenth-century treatises on diplomacy and international
law, records of official practice, and Founding-era dictionaries together
provide persuasive evidence that the framers defined “public
Minister[]” by reference to the law of nations, and that this definition
included many irregular emissaries. These authorities also suggest an
understanding that one who qualified as a public minister for the U.S.
government was necessarily an officer of the United States. The result
is that the appointment of both resident and many ad hoc diplomats
requires the Senate’s advice and consent under the original meaning of
the Appointments Clause.
B. The Pre-Constitutional Practice of Ad Hoc Diplomacy
The starting point for the analysis is one of context. Namely, ad
hoc diplomacy was far from novel at the time of the Founding; the
practice had deep origins in centuries of European politics. In fact, it is
common knowledge among historians that ad hoc diplomacy was the
quintessential mode of contact among European powers prior to the
late fifteenth century, when Italian city-states began to popularize the
use of permanent embassies and resident agents among rulers of
Western Europe.145 England and France, for example, had no
permanent embassies abroad until 1509, having previously relied
exclusively on special missions.146 The use of special envoys reportedly
predominated during this early period because sovereigns often lacked
sufficient funds to pay for permanent embassies, encountered difficulty
144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton).
145. See GARRETT MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 55–118 (1955) (discussing the
advent of the Italian model).
146. See JEREMY BLACK, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 53 (2010).
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finding suitable agents, or simply had no need for regular contact with
foreign counterparts.147
Many, moreover, were slow to adopt the Italian model. As M.S.
Anderson has explained, in the early seventeenth century “Europe was
still divided between a core of western states, in which permanent
diplomatic representation was well rooted and between which
diplomatic relations were active and more or less continuous, and a
periphery of less developed ones—the Scandinavian countries, Poland,
Russia, and in the west Scotland and Portugal—where diplomacy was
less important and diplomatic organisation more primitive.”148 The
Papacy restricted its embassies to Catholic courts.149 Russia had no
permanent embassies until 1688.150 The Ottoman Empire relied
exclusively on special missions until 1793, when it dispatched its first
resident ambassador to London.151 In addition, most of the princes who
used permanent missions chose not to maintain them in more than a
handful of countries.152 One-sided representation, whereby minor
powers established embassies in the capitals of major powers that
chose not to reciprocate, was common.153 These conditions ensured the
continuing importance of missions of limited duration and mandate.
English practice generally followed these trends, including the use
of special envoys after the normalization of permanent embassies.154 In
1759, for example, George II dispatched the earl of Kinnoull to
apologize for British incursions into Portugal’s territorial waters in the
Battle of Lagos.155 George III sent Major-General William Faucitt to
“many German courts with which [England] had no regular diplomatic
representation to raise German mercenaries to take part in the
[Revolutionary War].”156 The British also relied on irregular diplomats
to secure the use of Swiss troops for military operations.157 Still other
147. See id. at 47; KEITH HAMILTON & RICHARD LANGHORNE, THE PRACTICE OF
DIPLOMACY: ITS EVOLUTION, THEORY AND ADMINISTRATION 30 (1995).
148. M.S. ANDERSON, THE RISE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY 1450–1919, at 27–28 (1993).
149. Id.
150. BLACK, supra note 146, at 68.
151. See J.C. Hurewitz, Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System, 15 MIDDLE E. J.
141, 145 (1961).
152. See BLACK, supra note 146, at 69.
153. Id. at 71.
154. See D.B. HORN, THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 1689–1789, at 21–26 (1961).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 25–26.
157. See Christopher Storrs, British Diplomacy in Switzerland (1689–1789) and Eighteenth
Century Diplomatic Culture, 3 ÉTUDES DE LETTRES 1, 7 (2010).
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examples include missions to invest German princes with chivalric
orders, compliment new leadership, offer condolences, and even
conclude a treaty of marriage between George III and the Princess
Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz.158 Here as elsewhere, this mode of
contact was attractive in part because it was less expensive than
permanent representation.159
Many of the framers are likely to have been familiar with this
practice, which formed part of the only diplomatic tradition that was
reasonably accessible to them. Benjamin Franklin, who attended the
Constitutional Convention as a delegate for Pennsylvania, had
acquired years of experience with European diplomacy as a colonial
agent for Pennsylvania and as America’s leading representative abroad
during the Revolution.160 His background was exceptional among the
delegates, but even those without comparable experience had in most
cases served in the Continental Congress,161 where they received a
steady stream of news about the latest developments in European
politics,162 including details about diplomatic etiquette,163 copies of
correspondence between foreign sovereigns,164 and reports on the
dispatch of envoys from one court to another.165 Statements from the
Convention and ratification debates further suggest that the
participants were often knowledgeable about European politics and
diplomatic practices.166 And this is unsurprising. Given the precarious
158. HORN, supra note 154, at 26.
159. See id. at 36.
160. See KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 14–15.
161. See
Meet
the
Framers
of
the
Constitution,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/86TE-57B7] (listing
the delegates to the Convention).
162. See generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1957) (discussing inter alia American attention to European politcal
developments); see also Letter from Arthur Lee to the Comm. of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 25, 1779),
in 3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
142, at 100 (explaining that “it is the regular and usual mode in Europe for one nation to treat
with another on public business through the medium of their public ministers”).
163. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Robert Livingston (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 id. at 864–66
(discussing the importance of “[r]anks, titles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios” in
European diplomacy).
164. E.g., Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (March 29, 1781), in 4 id. at
335 (sharing with Congress a memorial presented by a Dutch envoy to the Swedish ambassador
in Paris).
165. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Apr. 24, 1780), in 3 id.
at 626–27 (reporting the use of an envoy extraordinary by the Empress of Russia to the Swedish
court).
166. See, e.g., Debates in the Federal Convention (June 28, 1787), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
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international position of the United States at the time, foreign relations
was a matter of national survival.167
Even more to the point, the United States had ample experience
sending and receiving special emissaries prior to the Convention. On
the sending side, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane tasked Arthur
Lee with traveling to Spain in 1777 to negotiate an alliance and
recognition of American independence.168 Lee failed to obtain either,
but managed to secure promises of future aid.169 Three years later, the
Continental Congress appointed John Laurens as an envoy to France
“for the special purpose of soliciting . . . the . . . aids requested by
Congress, and forwarding them to America without loss of time.”170
Laurens gained French assurances of naval support and returned home
six months later.171 In 1783, Congress designated John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson as commissioners to
negotiate peace treaties with the Barbary Powers.172 And in 1786,
Congress sent John Lamb, a brigadier general and customs collector
from New York, on a special mission to Algiers to secure the release
of American hostages.173
The founders also had experience receiving ad hoc diplomats. One
of the earlier examples came in 1775, when, still uncertain about the
wisdom of supporting American independence, the Count of
Vergennes sent Achard de Bonvouloir to the United States as a special
supra note 97, at 249–52 (discussing international relations among certain European states); The
Debate in the Convention of the State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 id. at 268 (recounting
developments at the 1713 Congress of Utrecht); The Debate in the Convention of the State of
South Carolina (Jan. 17, 1788), in 4 id. at 266 (“In England, the ministers proceed with caution in
making treaties.”); The Debate in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June 18, 1788), in 3 id.
at 505 (“It is the part of the laws of several Oriental nations to receive no ambassadors, and to
burn their prisoners. It is a custom with the grand seignior to receive, but not to send ambassadors.
It is a particular custom with him, in time of war with Russia, to put the Russian ambassador in
the Seven Towers.”).
167. See generally MARKS, supra note 126 (discussing American vulnerabilities under the
Articles of Confederation and their role in the adoption of the Constitution).
168. BEMIS, supra note 162, at 52–53.
169. Id. at 53.
170. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 1130, 1141 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1910).
171. 1 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, THE FINANCIER AND THE FINANCES OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 294–301 (1892) (discussing aid that Laurens secured from France); see also 1
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at
584–85 (discussing Laurens’s mission to France); GREGORY D. MASSEY, JOHN LAURENS AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 173–94 (2000) (same).
172. MARKS, supra note 126, at 38–40.
173. Id. at 41–42.
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agent to inquire about the seriousness of the movement for
independence.174 Bonvouloir’s subsequent report helped persuade the
French government to aid the American cause.175 Notably, his primary
contact had been the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the
members of which included Benjamin Franklin and John Dickinson,
both of whom attended the Constitutional Convention.176
Other salient precedents are the British peace commissions of the
1770s. Lord North appointed the members of the first of these, known
as the Howe Commission, in 1776 to offer pardons and a resumption
of trade in exchange for an end to hostilities and a pledge of
allegiance.177 Acting as spokesmen for Congress, Benjamin Franklin
and John Adams rejected the concessions as insufficient.178 Two years
later and with far less leverage, the British sent a second group known
as the Carlisle Commission to offer virtually anything Congress might
demand other than independence, but the effort again failed, the
United States having already secured recognition from the French.179
In short, ad hoc diplomacy was hardly an unknown or exotic concept
to the founders; they knew from experience that it was an important
feature of European and transatlantic relations.
C. European Usage
How, then, did contemporaries refer to these kinds of
representatives? Europeans consistently identified most of them as
public ministers.
Part of the evidence comes from eighteenth-century English case
law concerning the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, which
Parliament enacted after a famous incident involving the arrest and
detention of an indebted Russian ambassador.180 Peter the Great
viewed the arrest as a serious affront and demanded death sentences
for the perpetrators, but because the detention had been permissible
under English law at the time, the British government was unable to
174. BEMIS, supra note 162, at 22–23; KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 88.
175. JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 57–58
(1985).
176. See id. at 57; 2 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 5 (Nov.
29, 1775) (Thomas B. Wait ed., 1820).
177. KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 95.
178. See id. at 95–96.
179. RICHARD DEAN BURNS, JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA & JASON C. FLANAGAN, AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 4 (2013); KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 106.
180. JUSTIN MCCARTHY, THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE 317–20 (fine paper ed., 1911).
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hold anyone accountable.181 Instead, to mollify the Czar and prevent
similar incidents in the future,182 parliament passed the Diplomatic
Privileges Act, providing immunity from arrest and service of process
for “the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any
foreign prince or state authorized and received as such by her
Majesty . . . or the domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador, or other public minster,” and also designating as
“violators of the laws of nations” and subjecting to possible “pains,
penalties, and corporal punishment” anyone who infringed this
immunity.183
Judicial opinions interpreting the Act shed light on eighteenthcentury English understandings. Plaintiffs in civil cases often argued
that the statute did not apply because the defendant was not a “public
minister.” This line of argument required courts to ascertain precisely
what constitutes the category, and courts responded by adopting a
broad definition that included many ad hoc diplomats. In Barbuit’s
Case,184 which contained the most extensive discussion of the issue, the
question was whether a Prussian consular agent was a public minister
and thus immune from certain civil proceedings.185 The court
concluded that the agent failed to qualify for this status because he was
not “intrusted to transact affairs between . . . two crowns,” but instead
commissioned to “assist his Prussian Majesty’s subjects . . . in their
commerce.”186 In reaching this decision, the court emphasized that the
statutory phrase “ambassadors, or other public ministers” covered
both “ministers sent upon extraordinary occasions, which are
commonly called ambassadors extraordinary,” and those “who
constantly reside” at a foreign embassy.187 Thus, the consul could have
qualified as a minister even if the Prussian government had authorized
him only to “transact any one particular thing in that capacity, as every
ambassador extraordinary is; or to remove some particular difficulties,
which might otherwise occasion war.”188 The problem was simply that
he held not even this limited authority. Other precedents similarly
defined “public minister” as one who officially represents a sovereign
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 319–20.
7 Ann. c. 12 (1708) (Eng.) (capitalization and spelling modified from original).
Barbuit’s Case (1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 777 (Ch.).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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in foreign affairs, without apparent regard for considerations such as
duration of service and breadth of responsibility.189 Courts understood
these analyses to reflect the law of nations.190
European scholars took the same approach. Perhaps the most
influential in the realm of diplomacy studies was Abraham de
Wicquefort, a Dutch diplomat who published The Embassador and His
Functions in 1681.191 Translated into English in 1716 and widely viewed
at the time as one of the most important works in its field,192
Wicquefort’s treatise set out to classify diplomatic agents, describe
their responsibilities, and prescribe how they should conduct
themselves.193 It is a particularly useful indicator of eighteenth-century
understandings both because practitioners were familiar with it,194 and
because its approach was explicitly historical and inductive. The goal
was to identify the law by reference to state practice rather than by
deduction from principle or on the basis of ancient texts.195
Wicquefort devoted his entire first chapter to defining and
classifying the various types of public ministers in existence at the time.
To begin, he explained that the term “public minister” encompassed
two classes of actors. The first consisted of the “embassador”—“a
publick minister, dispatch’d by a sovereign prince to some foreign
189. See, e.g., Viveash v. Becker (1814) 105 Eng. Rep. 619, 620 (suggesting that one must
represent the sovereign in performing a state function to qualify as a public minister); Clarke v.
Cretico (1808) 1 Taunt. 106, 106 (explaining that a consul was not a public minister because it was
“no part of his office to transact business between . . . two states”). Contemporary English
dictionaries adopted similarly expansive definitions of the term “minister,” which in context was
understood to be a synonym for “public minister.” See, e.g., Minister, THOMAS DYCHE &
WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (18th ed., 1781) (defining
“minister” to mean “any great officer that has the charge of embassies or other concerns of
moment”).
190. See Barbuit’s Case 25 Eng. Rep. at 777 (explaining that the Diplomatic Privileges Act is
“declaratory of the antient universal jus gentium”); Triquet and Others v. Bath (1764) 3 Burr.
1478, 1480 (“This privilege of foreign ministers and their domestic servants depends upon the law
of nations. The Act of Parliament of 7 Ann. c. 12, is declaratory of it.”).
191. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84; see also Maurice Keens-Soper, Francois de Calliéres and
Diplomatic Theory, 16 HIST. J. 485, 492 (1973) (discussing the publication of Wicquefort’s
treatise).
192. See generally Keens-Soper, supra note 191 (describing the significance of the treatise).
193. See generally WICQUEFORT, supra note 84 (discussing the categories and functions of
early diplomatic agents).
194. See HORN, supra note 154, at 192 (discussing how British diplomats “received a great
deal of advice from Wicquefort”); see also GILBERT, supra note 137, at 94 (explaining that
Wicquefort’s treatise was one of “the two most famous books” on the subject of diplomacy in the
eighteenth century “and ran through many editions”).
195. Cf. Keens-Soper, supra note 191, at 494–95 (discussing the importance of Wicquefort’s
treatise).
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potentate or state, there to represent his person, by virtue of a power,
letters of credence, or some commission that notifies his character.”196
The
second
comprised
all
other
diplomats,
including
“plenipotentiaries . . . internuncios,
envoys,
residents,
agents,
commissioners, the secretaries of embassies, and even the secretaries
of embassadors,”197 along with “those persons whom princes employ
by a verbal order.”198 Members of this second class held lower rank
because, unlike ambassadors, they did not represent the sovereign in
“his person.”199 But what tied the two classes together and
distinguished public ministers from other kinds of government officials
was that they were charged by a sovereign “with the prosecution or
sollicitation of affairs” vis-a-vis a foreign court and “enjoy[ed] the
protection of the law of nations in its full extent.”200
Wicquefort plainly included a wide variety of ad hoc diplomats
within this group. On his account, service on a special mission merely
qualified a person as a different type of public minister, rather than as
something other than a public minister. He acknowledged, for example,
that there are both “embassadors ordinary,” whom he understood to
reside at a foreign embassy for a substantial period and represent the
sending sovereign in any matters that might arise, and “embassadors
extraordinary,” whom he understood to travel to a foreign court on
behalf of a sovereign to complete a discrete task, but he argued that
“there is no essential difference between them.”201 Wicquefort also
enumerated some of the purposes for which a ruler might send a public
minister to a foreign court: to negotiate, “to be a witness to an oath, for
the observation and execution of a treaty of peace, or to represent his
prince at the ceremonies of a christening, a marriage, a coronation, or
a funeral.”202 To be clear, these were not simply tasks that the ruler
might choose to delegate to a representative already resident abroad,
but instead reasons for dispatching a separate public minister

196. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2 (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from
original).
197. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).
198. Id. (capitalization modified from original).
199. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).
200. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).
201. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) (capitalization and spelling modified from original); see also
id. at 8, 10, 22 (implying that ambassadors “ordinary” are those who reside abroad, while
ambassadors “extraordinary” are those who travel abroad temporarily and to carry out a limited
assignment).
202. Id. (capitalization modified from original).
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altogether. Wicquefort also wove examples of ad hoc diplomacy into
his discussion and explained how this form of contact remained the
norm for some states, such as Poland.203 No one familiar with
Wicquefort’s treatise could have mistaken his position.
Though he devoted less attention to the matter, François de
Calliéres, a French diplomat who rivaled Wicquefort as the most
popular eighteenth-century commentator on diplomatic practice,204
appears to have concurred. “Publick ministers,” he explained, “may be
divided into two kinds; the first and second order.”205 “Those of the
first order are ambassadors extraordinary, and ambassadors ordinary,”
while “those of the second order are envoys extraordinary, and
residents.”206 Members of these orders excluded diplomats sent by
anyone other than a sovereign, such as the “estates of a country, or the
magistrates of a town,”207 but included those sent on a mission of “no
great duration”208 and those given limited assignments, such as
attending a peace conference or mediating among warring princes.209
Wicquefort and Calliéres were not breaking new ground in taking
this position. In an important 1603 treatise, the French diplomat Jean
Hotman had defined “ambassador” to refer to those “who under the
assurance of the public faith, authorized by the law of nations, are
employed to negotiate with foreign princes or commonwealths the
affairs of their masters, and with dignity to represent their persons and
greatness during their ambassage.”210 These agents, he explained, are
of two types: ambassadors extraordinary and ordinary.211 The first are
sent “for a little time, and for one affair only, as, for renewing some
alliance, to swear and ratify a treaty, to congratulate, condole, or to do
like office in the behalf of their masters,” and “return as soon as that

203. See id. at 3, 6.
204. See THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1600–1715, at 301–20 (Andrew Lossky ed. 1967)
(explaining that Calliéres’s book, The Art of Negotiating With Sovereign Princes, “enjoyed
immediate success, and has been regarded ever since as a classic text on diplomacy”); GILBERT,
supra note 137, at 94 (describing the books by Wicquefort and Calliéres as the eighteenth
century’s “two most famous books” on diplomacy).
205. FRANÇOIS DE CALLIÉRES, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING WITH SOVEREIGN PRINCES 63
(3d ed. 1738) (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).
206. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).
207. Id. at 69, 72 (capitalization modified from original).
208. Id. at 216 (capitalization modified from original).
209. Id. at 229–30.
210. See JEAN HOTMAN, THE AMBASSADOR B2 (James Shawe trans., 1603) (capitalization
and spelling modified from original).
211. Id. at B2–B3 (capitalization and spelling modified from original).
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affair is dispatched.”212 The second serve “without having any time
limited, but at the pleasure of the prince which [s]endeth them.”213
Writing in 1585, Alberico Gentili had similarly distinguished between
these two types, with resident ambassadors—“time ambassadors” in
his terminology—being those sent “on no specific or definite business
but for a period of time sometimes prescribed, sometimes not, with the
understanding that while they are on the embassy they shall be
responsible for the negotiation and performance of everything
which . . . may happen to be in the interest” of the sending sovereign,
and all other ambassadors being “sent on a special occasion, their
orders being to return as soon as they have accomplished their
mission.”214
Later treatises were also consistent with Wicquefort and Calliéres.
Emmerich de Vattel explained in 1758 that the term “public minister”
included three distinct orders. The first and highest-ranking were the
“ambassadors,” who represented princes “not only in their rights and
in the transaction of their affairs, but also in their dignity, their
greatness, and their pre-eminence.”215 The second and third consisted
of “[e]nvoys” and “resident[s],” respectively.216 Functionally
indistinguishable from one another, these latter orders represented the
sovereign prince “in his affairs,” but not “in his dignity.”217 They could
transact and communicate, in other words, but unlike ambassadors
were not treated as the sovereign in ceremonial matters. Yet Vattel was
not overly concerned with the formalities of rank. In his view, the term
“public minister” “denote[d] any person intrusted with the
management of public affairs, but [was] more particularly understood

212. Id. (capitalization and spelling modified from original).
213. Id. at B3.
214. See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES 14 (Gordon J. Laing trans.,
Oxford University Press 1924) (1585).
215. See VATTEL, supra note 81, at 459.
216. Id. at 459–60.
217. See id. According to Travers Twiss:
Louis XI of France is said to have been the first of the European Sovereigns, who
accredited to another Sovereign Power a Public Minister to represent him in the
conduct of his affairs only, and not in respect of his personal dignity; and his
example led the way to the introduction of two distinct classes of diplomatic
Agents, a higher class representing the dignity of the person of their Constituent
as well as his affairs, and a lower class simply representing him in the transaction
of his affairs.
TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
Communities 340 (London, Clarendon Press 1884).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

946

[Vol. 68:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

to designate one who acts in such capacity at a foreign court.”218 In
short, anyone sent by a prince “with credentials and on public
business” was a public minister,219 and this was true even of individuals
with nontraditional ranks, such as deputy and commissioner.220 Vattel
did not specifically address the status of ad hoc diplomats, but his
capacious definition betrayed little concern for the precise purpose or
duration of the mission at hand. The only groups he explicitly excluded
were “agents,” whom he defined as those “appointed by princes to
transact their private affairs,” and “secret ministers,” whose “character
is not public.”221
Other writers from the mid- to late eighteenth century also
concurred. Although he did not use the term “public minister,” the
Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek defined “ambassador” as
including a nonresident variety. His position was that “[a]mbassadors
extraordinary . . . are sent with a commission to transact a particular
piece of business, while the instructions of ambassadors in ordinary
cover not one thing only but all things.”222 Citing Wicquefort, he also
explained that qualification for the status of ambassador under
international law hinged on “the nature of the mandate,” rather than a
person’s rank.223 Years later, the German jurist Georg Friedrich von
Martens defined “public minister” to mean “the person whom the
sovereign has appointed to superintend his affairs at some foreign
court.”224 Like others, Martens explained that ambassadors were a type
of public minister, and that there were both ambassadors ordinary and
extraordinary, with the division “serv[ing] originally to distinguish
perpetual embassadors, from such as were sent on some particular
business.”225 By the late 1700s, sovereigns vested even some of their
resident diplomats with the title of “ambassador extraordinary” in

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

VATTEL, supra note 81, at 453.
See id. at 461.
See id.
See id. at 461, 485.
CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE FORO LEGATORUM LIBER SIGULARIS: A
MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES 9 (Gordon J. Laing trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press photo. reprint 1946) (1744).
223. Id. at 64 (“[W]hatever title it may have pleased a prince to use in his mandate, it is all the
same so far as the right of embassy is concerned.”).
224. See GEORG FRIEDRICH VON MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS,
FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 196
(William Cobbett trans., 1795) (capitalization modified from original).
225. See id. at 203–04 (capitalization modified from original).
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order to convey a heightened sense of dignity, but the prior usage, by
which extraordinary meant ad hoc, had not entirely disappeared.226
The fundamental consistency among these sources seems
significant. Some of the authors were diplomats while others were
jurists. In the case of Gentili and Martens they wrote more than two
centuries apart from one another. And they had different nationalities.
None of them, however, suggested that ad hoc diplomats were
categorically or even typically something other than public ministers,
or that remuneration, tenure, or any other Hartwell-like condition was
necessary to qualify as such. To the extent they addressed these issues,
they explicitly concluded otherwise.227
D. American Familiarity with European Usage
The English legal authorities and the European treatises are key
pieces of the historical analysis for one simple reason: they were
familiar and important to those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution. Both Blackstone’s Commentaries and participants in the
ratification debates discussed the incident that led to the Diplomatic
Privileges Act of 1708,228 and Congress used that statute as the model
for the Crimes Act of 1790, which employed virtually identical
language to prohibit arrest and service of process against “the person
of any ambassador or other public minister of any foreign prince or
state, authorized and received as such by the President of the United
States, or the domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or
other public minster.”229 An early opinion from U.S. Attorney General
William Wirt also mentioned the English statute, along with the
decision in Barbuit’s Case.230

226. See id.
227. Originalist analyses of the Constitution often scrutinize the writing of individuals such as
William Blackstone and Samuel von Puffendorf, but while some of these other authors discussed
rules pertaining to diplomatic immunity, they did not attempt to define “ambassador” or “public
minister.” See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN
FOUR BOOKS 226–30 (1902). I therefore omit them.
228. See id. at 247–48; The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia
(June 21, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 503.
229. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112.
230. See U.S. Attorney General, Opinion Letter on Foreign Ministers, Consuls, &c. (Dec. 1,
1820), as reprinted in 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF DEPARTMENTS IN RELATION TO THEIR
OFFICIAL DUTIES 407–09 (Benjamin F. Hall ed., 1852) (1820) (characterizing the pertinent
language of the Crimes Act of 1790 as an “exact transcript” of the Diplomatic Privileges Act of
1708 and citing Barbuit’s Case).
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Many of the framers were equally familiar with the leading
treatises. Legal scholars have long recognized as much, especially with
respect to writers such as Vattel,231 but what is interesting is that this
familiarity extended specifically into writing on matters of diplomacy.
For example, it appears that early American diplomats read Vattel’s
analysis on the definition of “public minister.” While serving at the
court at St. Petersburg, Francis Dana wrote a letter to Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Robert Livingston, querying whether Congress’s
decision to commission him as a minister plenipotentiary “ha[d] been
taken from Vattel’s Law of Nations, where he treats of the several
orders of public ministers.”232 In Dana’s view, the chosen title had
failed to serve its purpose insofar as Russia treated ministers
plenipotentiary no differently than simple ministers.233 Vattel’s
discussion on public ministers also appeared in major news outlets.234
Key leaders of the Revolution were also familiar with the major
commentators on diplomatic affairs. In 1783, a congressional
committee composed of James Madison, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh
Williamson reported a “list of books proper for the use of Congress,
and proposed that the secretary should be instructed to procure the
same.”235 This list included roughly two dozen works on international
law and diplomatic practice—including the treatises by Wicquefort,
Calliéres, Hotman, Gentili, and Bynkershoek236—and committee

231. See generally Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 547 (2012) (acknowledging the Framers’ familiarity with Vattel, but critiquing the
tendency to privilege him over other writers of the period).
232. See Letter from Francis Dana to Robert Livingston (Sept. 5, 1782), in 5 THE
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at
702.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Ambassadors, and Other Public
Functionaries (By Vattel), NAT’L INTELLIGENCER & WASH. ADVERTISER, Nov. 17, 1809.
235. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (Jan. 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 97, at 27.
236. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 170, at 83–84.
James Madison compiled a list of books on the topic of diplomacy. 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: 1 JANUARY 1783–30 APRIL 1783, at 62–71 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1969) (including the following list of books: FRANÇOIS DE CALLIÉRES, THE ART OF
NEGOTIATING WITH SOVEREIGN PRINCES (Eng. ed., 1716); CARLO MARIA CARAFA,
L’AMBASCIADORE POLITICO CHRISTIANO (1692); ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS
LIBRI TRES (1585); JEAN HOTMAN, DE LA CHARGE ET DIGNITÉ DE L’AMBASSADEUR (James
Shawe trans., 1603); FREDERICK MARSALAER, LEGATUS (1618); CARLO PASQUALE, LEGATUS
(1598); J. DE LA SARRAS DU FRANQUESNAY, LE MINISTRE PUBLIC DANS LES COURS
ESTRANGERES &C. (1731); ANTOINE DE VERA, EL EMBAXADOR (1620); and ABRAHAM
WICQUEFORT, THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FUNCTIONS (Eng. ed., 1716)). Publication years,
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members advocated its acquisition on the view that “Congress should
have at all times at command such authors on the law of nations,
treaties, negotiations, &c., as would render their proceedings in such
cases conformable to propriety.”237 The proposal was defeated due to
concerns about cost,238 but the list still “represents an educated 18th
century view of what the legislator-statesman ought to be reading” and
suggests “many of the very books with which Madison”—the list’s
primary author—“prepared himself for the ordeal of the
Constitutional Convention four years later.”239 Other references
corroborate this view: Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth cited Wicquefort
in an early circuit court opinion addressing the prosecution of a U.S.
citizen for violations of the Treaty of Paris.240 Thomas Jefferson
recommended Bynkershoek’s work on ambassadors to James Madison
a year after Congress considered the acquisition list,241 and he included
the works of Wicquefort and Calliéres in his personal library
catalogue.242
This evidence is in line with other indications that influential
revolutionaries made serious efforts to learn European diplomatic
protocol. For instance, in 1779, while serving in France, John Adams
requested reimbursement after purchasing and studying a “large
collection of books on the . . . letters and memoirs of those ambassadors
and public ministers who had acquired the fairest fame and had done
the greatest services to their countries,”243 and Congress approved his

editions, and volumes are in some cases estimates. Id. With the exception of the books by
Calliéres, Gentili, Hotman, and Wicquefort, English translations of the listed works do not appear
to exist.
237. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (Jan. 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 97, at 27.
238. Id.
239. Loren Eugene Smith, The Library List of 1783, at 4–5 (Jan. 30, 1969) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School), http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/87
[http://perma.cc/FKT2-C666].
240. Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1332 (Cir. Ct. D. Conn. 1799).
241. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 20, 1784), in 21 LETTERS
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 369–70 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1994) (“I have had an opportunity here
of examining Bynkershoek’s works. There are about a fourth part of them which you would like
to have . . . [including] du Juge competent des Ambassadeurs . . . .”).
242. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1783 CATALOGUE OF BOOKS [circa 1775–1812], at 84–85
(electronic ed. 2003), https://www.masshist.org/thomasjeffersonpapers/doc?id=catalog1783_84
[http://perma.cc/G5EN-DBKA]. This catalog is “a record of works [Jefferson] already possessed
and of others he desired to acquire.” 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 236, at 64.
243. Letter from John Adams to the Treasury Board (Sept. 19, 1779), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 327.
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request.244 In 1780, Congress’s instructions to Francis Dana, the new
minister plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, ordered him to “endeavor
to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and etiquette of the
court at which [he would] reside.”245 American and foreign diplomats
in turn educated Congress on the accepted conventions.246
The idea that the framers studied these works is also in accord with
evidence concerning the execution of American diplomacy, especially
toward the later years of the Revolution. Inspired perhaps by the
philosophes, the first Americans involved in foreign relations “paid
little attention to the traditional forms and disregarded well established
rules of diplomatic etiquette.”247 Benjamin Franklin thus wore the
rustic fur cap of a backwoodsman while serving “among the Powder’d
Heads of Paris,”248 and American envoys self-consciously employed a
new language of commerce and trade over political alliance.249 One
might imagine that such practices would have limited the importance
of knowledge about European usage. But while they retained a critical
instinct toward many practices of the Old World, the framers appear
to have conformed in many cases. In 1776, General Washington
granted safe conduct passes to the members of the Howe Commission
in accordance with European custom.250 In 1778, after the French sent
their first public minister to Philadelphia, Congress followed
established etiquette by sending to Paris a single diplomatic agent of
equal rank, even though this required dissolving the joint commission
of Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane, who had served in

244. Id. at 329.
245. Instructions to Francis Dana, as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court at St. Petersburgh
(Dec. 19 1780), in 4 id. at 201–03.
246. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to John Jay (May 13, 1785), in 1 DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 497 (Washington, Blair & Rives 1837) (explaining
an English custom whereby both public ministers and their families must be introduced to the
Queen); Letter from John Adams to Robert Livingston (July 31, 1783), in 6 REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 621–24 (reporting
advice received from the Comte Montagnini de Mirabel, the minister plenipotentiary from the
King of Sardinia, who wished to advise Congress on certain matters of protocol, including the
need to “be very exact in the etiquette of titles” in correspondence with European leaders); Letter
from Silas Deane to the Comm. of Secret Correspondence (Nov. 28, 1776), in 2 id. at 196 (advising
Congress to consider adopting the “long-accustomed form and etiquette” of the Old World in
correspondence with European powers).
247. PAUL A. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 4 (1963).
248. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Mrs. Thompson (Feb. 8, 1777), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 26 (Albert Henry Smythe ed., 1906).
249. KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 93–94.
250. Id. at 95.
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France since 1776.251 In 1781, after the British imprisoned the
American envoy Henry Laurens in the Tower of London on charges of
treason, his son John Laurens reported to Congress that he had
“consulted the several ministers at the court of France upon the proper
measures to be taken when such a flagrant violation of the laws of
nations had been offered in the person of a public minister, and
solicited their intervention and assistance.”252 In 1786, John Jay
brushed aside a British consul’s objections to American violations of
the Treaty of Paris by pointing out that consuls lacked authority to
raise such issues as a matter of international law.253
Anyone who paid attention knew that much was at stake in these
matters. Adams, for one, warned Congress multiple times of the risks
of disregarding diplomatic norms. On one occasion he lectured that an
improvement in the position of the United States vis-à-vis Europe
would “never be accomplished but by conforming to the usages
established in the world.”254 On another he warned that Americans
would “have cause for severe repentance” if they failed to conform,255
and contemporaries did not have to look far to see that he was probably
right.256 In navigating such issues, familiarity with the likes of
Wicquefort and Calliéres would have been enormously useful, serving
as a source of vital insights on European expectations, as a form of

251. DULL, supra note 175, at 100–01.
252. Letter from John Laurens to the President of Congress (Sept. 6, 1781), in 4
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at
700.
253. Letter from John Jay to John Temple (Apr. 7, 1786), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 243, at 109; Report of John
Jay Relative to Richard Lawrence (May 26, 1788), reprinted in 3 id. at 126–27; see also David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, The Law
of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 959 (2010)
(discussing this incident).
254. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Feb. 26, 1786), in 2 REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 243, at 574.
255. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 id. at 802–03.
256. The assault on the French consul Barbé de Marbois in Philadelphia in 1784 provided one
salient example. This incident, together with Congress’s feckless response, provoked the fury of
the French government, which demanded that American officials treat the offense as a violation
of the law of nations and surrender the perpetrator to their custody. G.S. Rowe & Alexander W.
Knott, The Longchamps Affair (1784–86), the Law of Nations, and the Shaping of Early American
Foreign Policy, 10 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 199, 202 (1986). It also inspired threats that the French,
Dutch, Swedish, and Spanish governments would withdraw their legations if the United States
failed to cooperate. Id. at 203.
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leverage in negotiations, and as evidence of belonging to the class of
governments from which the United States sought recognition.257
E. The Incorporation of European Usage
Unsurprisingly, then, there is considerable evidence that the
framers were not only familiar with the theory and practice of
diplomacy in Europe, and not only conformed in many cases to
European custom, but also incorporated into American practice the
European and international legal understanding that many ad hoc
diplomats are public ministers. Equally important, the framers did not
graft onto this understanding any additional domestic criteria in
applying the Appointments Clause; they required the Senate’s advice
and consent for the appointment of anyone who qualified as a public
minister for the United States under the law of nations. This conclusion
draws support from a variety of angles, including symmetry between
the law of nations and the phrasing of the Appointments Clause;
official practice during the presidential administrations of George
Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson; debates in Congress;
early dictionaries; and the nature of diplomatic assignments in the
eighteenth century.
1. Textual Symmetry. A close reading of the Appointments Clause
presents a puzzle: why would the framers provide for a specific power
to appoint ambassadors while separately providing for a more general
power to appoint public ministers? In European practice, the term
“public minister” had covered a rather extensive hierarchy of ranks,
including ambassador, envoy, resident, minister, agent, chargé
d’affaires, and secretary of legation, among others.258 This hierarchy
was complex, evolved over time, and varied by court.259 Yet there was
no question, including among the framers, that ambassadors belonged
within it.260 In this context, those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution must have understood that retaining a separate reference
to ambassadors did nothing to change the scope of the appointment

257. Cf. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 133 (2015) (discussing the importance early
American leaders attached to learning and following European diplomatic customs).
258. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 84.
259. Id.
260. This is apparent from the text of the Appointments Clause, which explicitly identifies
ambassador as a subcategory of public minister. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. It is also apparent from
the major treatises on diplomatic practice. See supra Part III.C.

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

AD HOC DIPLOMATS

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

953

power; a clause that provided only for the appointment of public
ministers and consuls would have been functionally identical to the
version that emerged from the Convention. Moreover, redundancy
aside, the separate reference to ambassadors is surprising in light of an
early American aversion to the use of that particular rank of public
minister, which, owing to an historical association with European
monarchy and ceremonial extravagance, had both political
connotations and budgetary implications that were unappealing to
many of the Founding era.261 In short, why would the framers retain
functionally redundant language, the apparent effect of which was to
emphasize the power to appoint a type of diplomat that many of them
viewed with particular disfavor?262
There are a few conceivable explanations. One is that the drafters
desired to emphasize the sovereign equality of the United States in
relation to Europe, and chose to do so by underscoring the nation’s
right to send diplomats of a rank historically reserved for major
powers.263 On this view, the language of the Appointments Clause may
have had an international communicative dimension; the message was
that the new republic, like the monarchies of the Old World, possessed
international sovereignty in full. Another possibility is that the Clause
reflects the lingering influence of the Articles of Confederation, which
provided only for the sending and receiving of “ambassadors.”264 On
this reading, the separate reference to ambassadors may be an artifact
of an undertheorized and incremental revision by which the drafters
attached an additional provision for public ministers without
considering its relationship to the preexisting language. Still another
possibility is that the framers were simply channeling the law of

261. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 112, at 265 (James Madison) (discussing
grades of public ministers other than ambassadors as those “which the United States will be most
likely to prefer”); see also ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 82 (explaining that as late as the midseventeenth century, “[i]t was still widely accepted that only major rulers (kings and the republic
of Venice) could send and receive ambassadors”); WILLIAM BARNES & JOHN HEATH MORGAN,
THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUNCTIONS 146
(1961) (“[T]he rank of ambassador had been regarded as too exalted for the representatives of a
democratic nation and was, moreover, identified with the monarchical system to whose trappings
and titles the United States had no wish to defer.”).
262. In fact, this aversion was so longstanding that the United States did not appoint its first
diplomat with the rank of ambassador until 1893. BARNES & MORGAN, supra note 261, at 146.
263. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 59 (discussing how “republics ranked lower than any
kind of monarchy” in early European diplomatic protocol).
264. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, § 1.
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nations, such that the separate references to ambassadors and public
ministers mirrored the doctrinal architecture of the law of diplomacy.
These options are not necessarily incompatible, but the available
evidence offers strongest support for the last of the three. While there
is substantial evidence of sensitivity to European perceptions of the
United States, and of a desire to be perceived as coequal,265 there is
little to show that those sentiments played a role specifically in the
drafting of the Appointments Clause. In addition, records from the
Constitutional Convention depict the drafting process as generally
purposeful and deliberative,266 and thus cast doubt on the idea that the
redundancy is a product of oversight.
Several points, meanwhile, suggest that the phrasing of the Clause
reflects the law of nations. First, as shown above, many of the framers
were familiar with diplomatic law and viewed its major European
expositors as authoritative.267 Second, the phrasing of the Clause is
unmistakably symmetrical to the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708 and
the writing of early commentators: all of these authorities divided
public ministers into the two nonobvious classes of (1) ambassadors
and (2) diplomats of every other rank.268 According to writers such as
Wicquefort and Vattel, this scheme reflected an important functional
difference: when interfacing with foreign courts, ambassadors were the
only public ministers empowered to act and be treated as if they were
the very person of the sending sovereign.269 This difference, though
somewhat strange by modern standards, was important in early
European diplomacy, when rulers relied upon a baroque system of
rank and ceremony to communicate the status of their relations with
other courts and resolve conflicts of precedence among foreign
emissaries.270 Finally, early American officials consistently and

265. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 126, at 96–141.
266. Cf. KLARMAN, supra note 120, at 126–256 (recounting the drafting process and
accompanying debates). But cf. MARKS, supra note 126, at 160 (suggesting that “there was
minimum floor debate on the diplomatic powers, and the momentous shift from Senate to
president occurred at the very end of the session when tempers were short and patience wearing
thin”).
267. See supra Part III.D.
268. Compare U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 (providing for the power to appoint “Ambassadors”
and “other public Ministers”), with 7 Ann., c. 12 (1708) (Eng.) (voiding all writs and processes
brought against “any Ambassador, or other publick Minister”), CALLIÉRES, supra note 205, at 63
(distinguishing ambassadors from all other types of public ministers), and WICQUEFORT, supra
note 84, at 2 (same).
269. VATTEL, supra note 81, at 459; WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2.
270. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 56–68.
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repeatedly took the position that the law of nations informs the
meaning of the Appointments Clause.271 As James Madison explained,
“[t]he case of diplomatic missions belongs to the Law of Nations, and
the principles & usages on which that is founded are entitled to a
certain influence in expounding the provisions of the Constitution
which have relation to such missions.”272 It would be only natural for
the Clause to use the same terminology and phrasing as the law that
informed its drafting and application. This law, as I have shown, treated
a wide variety of ad hoc diplomats as public ministers.
271. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284, 290–91 (1854) (“All
offices under the government of the United States are created, either by the law of nations, such
as ambassadors and other public ministers, or by the constitution and the statutes. As to
ambassadors and other public ministers, the usage of nations determines the tenure of their
commissions to be at the will of the appointing power.”); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1170–71 (1798)
(statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper) (arguing that the office of public minister is “derived
from the law of nations,” rather than from the Constitution); 3 THE HISTORICAL REGISTER OF
THE UNITED STATES 223 (1814) (statement of Sen. Outerbridge Horsey) (“The office of a public
minister is not an office created by the constitution, nor by any municipal law, but emanates from
the law of nations.”); On the Constitutional Power of the President to Originate the Appointment
of a Foreign Minister (Mar. 1826), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 480–81 (“If an
appointment be to an office to be exercised within the limits of the United States or its territories,
it must be to one which exists, and has been created by the municipal laws of the United States.
If to an office which is to be exercised without the limits of the United States . . . it must be to one
which exists, and is recognized by the general principles of international law . . . .”); see also Sarah
H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2006) (stating that terms
such as “ambassador” reference “concepts defined by international law and have been
understood as inviting consideration of international rules”). This position helps to explain why
the Framers permitted the president, with the Senate’s advice and consent, to make diplomatic
appointments even where Congress had not created by statute the offices to which the
appointments were made. The general understanding appears to have been that these offices
required no statutory enactment because they existed by virtue of the law of nations. See
WRISTON, supra note 3, at 131 (“When the new government under the Constitution was
established, Congress took no action and the executive department proceeded to organize a
diplomatic and consular service in accord with its own interpretation of the rules of customary
international law.”); Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador to Vietnam,
20 Op. O.L.C. 284, 286–88 (1996) (discussing other early evidence of this view).
272. James Madison, Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the
Recess of the Senate (undated memorandum), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91 n.1
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 6, 1822),
in id. at 91–93 (“One question is, whether a Public Minister be an officer in the strict constitutional
sense . . . . According to my recollection this subject was on some occasion carefully searched into,
& it was found that the practice of the Govt. had from the beginning been regulated by the idea
that the places or offices of Pub. Ministers & Consuls existed under the law & usages of Nations,
and were always open to receive appointments as they might be made by competent
authorities.”); Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (May 10, 1822), in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MONROE 285 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1902) (“Your view of the Constitution,
as to the powers of the Executive in the appointment of public Ministers, is in strict accord with
my own, and is, as I understand, supported by numerous precedents, under successive
administrations.”).
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2. Early Appointments. On its own, symmetry between the law of
nations and the wording of the Constitution leaves plenty of room for
uncertainty. But the evidence gets better: the Washington
Administration treated most ad hoc diplomats as both public ministers
and officers of the United States by regularly seeking the Senate’s
advice and consent to their appointment. According to a report
compiled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1888 and
reproduced with modifications in Table 1, Washington utilized twentynine ad hoc diplomats.273 From these a few trends stand out. First,
President Washington sought and obtained the Senate’s advice and
consent in eighteen of the cases, often even though the Senate had
already confirmed the same individual’s nomination to a different, but
still-ongoing diplomatic appointment. In 1792, for example,
Washington sought advice and consent for William Carmichael to
negotiate a treaty with Spain.274 He did this even though the Senate had
already confirmed Carmichael to the position of chargé d’affaires at
Madrid in 1789, and even though Carmichael continued to occupy that
office at the time of his subsequent nomination.275 From a legal
standpoint, this practice is inexplicable unless the Administration
understood ad hoc treaty negotiators to be public ministers and officers

273. S. Exec. Rep. No. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE
RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, First Congress, First Session to
Fifty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Treaties and Legislation Respecting Them 337–62 (1901).
The modifications are the additions of the appointments of Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin,
David Humphreys, Beverly Randolph, Abraham Ogden, Thomas Barclay, Joseph Donaldson,
Joel Barlow, Henry Knox, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Innes, Christopher Gore, William
Pinckney, Timothy Pickering, and Isaac Smith, all of which were omitted in the original report. I
identified these additions by comparing the report to (1) the Senate Executive Journal, (2)
Charles Lanman’s BIOGRAPHICAL ANNALS OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING ITS FIRST CENTURY (1876), and (3) Balances Due to and From the United
States, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 49-363, 49th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1886). I relied on these sources because, in aggregate, they seemed likely to identify all
ad hoc diplomatic appointments from the Founding: The Senate Executive Journal reports all
nominations for which the President sought Senate confirmation. Charles Lanman’s publication
presents “the names and public services of all those who have, in a prominent manner, been
identified with the National and State Governments of the Republic.” LANMAN, supra note 273,
at 3. And the Treasury report, which was produced in response to a House resolution “calling for
a report of all balances due to and from the United States, as shown by the books of the offices
of the Register and Sixth Auditor of the Treasury Department, from 1789 to 30th of June, 1885,”
identifies individuals who received financial compensation for various forms of federal service.
Balances Due to and From the United States, supra note 274, at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
In seeking out and reviewing these additional sources, I have made every effort to ensure
accuracy, but it is possible that omissions and other inaccuracies remain.
274. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (1st Sess. 1792), at 95–96.
275. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 33–34.
ON FOREIGN
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of the United States.
Second, seven of the remaining eleven cases were recess
appointments that do not reveal the Administration’s position on
unilateral, nonrecess cases. If anything, statements from the
Administration suggest that it viewed the appointments as active only
until the Senate reconvened. Washington independently appointed
John Paul Jones to negotiate with the Dey of Algiers, for instance, but
accepted that Jones’s commission would continue in force “only till the
next session of the Senate.”276 In a similar spirit, the Administration
made efforts to ensure that other recess appointees completed their
assignments within the time limits of the recess.277

276. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Paul Jones (June 1, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JUNE–31 DECEMBER 1792, at 3–10 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990).
277. See, e.g., No. 66: Morocco & Algiers (Dec. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 288 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington,
Gales and Seaton 1832) (discussing Thomas Barclay’s assignment to negotiate with Algiers, and
informing him that “it is expected the objects of your mission will be accomplished . . . [b]efore
the end of the next session of the Senate”).
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Table 1: Ad Hoc Diplomats of the Washington Administration278
Name
Gouverneur
Morris

Appointment Appointment
Date
10/13/1789

Method
President
(recess)

Rank

Private agent

Purpose
Investigation
(UK)

Other Office Held

None

278. Table 1 and the others below exclude five individuals who received ad hoc foreign
assignments of a nondiplomatic character. The first is Andrew Ellicott, whom Secretary of State
John Jay sent to Canada to ascertain a meridian line. See Letter from George Washington to
Henry Knox (Sept. 5, 1789), 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES,
1 JUNE – SEPTEMBER 1789, at 601–03 n.1 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989) (noting that Ellicott was
“appointed for the purpose” of determining the meridian line); see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra
note 25, at 299 (discussing this precedent as evidence of an original understanding in favor of
executive control over foreign affairs). The remaining four—Samuel Bayard and Nathaniel
Higginson in 1794, James Henry in 1805, and Hugh Lennox in 1806—went overseas to assist
American merchants who had suffered property loss and impressment at the hands of the British
navy. See David L. Sterling, A Federalist Opposes the Jay Treaty: The Letters of Samuel Bayard,
18 WM. & MARY Q. 408, 408–10 (1961) (describing Bayard’s role as “unofficial spokesman of
American merchants whose ships had been confiscated by Great Britain early in the wars of the
French Revolution” and recounting Bayard’s efforts to obtain relief for the merchants from
British courts); see also 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 382–400, 802–20 (1796) (reporting a debate during
which members of Congress discussed the work of Bayard and Higginson as nondiplomatic in
character); Letter from James Madison to James Henry (Mar. 25, 1805), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 171–72 (Mary A. Hackett et al. eds., 2011) (describing Henry’s duties as
“altogether confined to the relief of [American] Seamen, who may be left destitute in [Jamaica],
or who may be impressed”); Letter from James Madison to Hugh Lennox (Mar. 5, 1806),
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-11-02-0260 [https://
perma.cc/DG74-VQ8C] (describing Lennox’s duties as “altogether confined to the relief of
[American] Seamen, who may be left destitute in [Jamaica], or who may be impressed”). Because
these five individuals were not public ministers under any fair reading of the law of nations,
contemporaries did not view the act of appointing them without Senate confirmation as
constitutionally problematic. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 382–400, 802–20 (1796) (statement of
James Madison) (arguing that agents such as Bayard and Higginson “were neither Ambassadors,
public Ministers, nor Consuls,” and “would have no rank as public characters, but be mere
agents”). Table 1 also excludes an Appendix C entry for Rufus King, who was appointed as
minister plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom in 1796. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess.
1796), at 209. Although President Washington reportedly appointed King to “conclude a treaty
of commerce with Great Britain, and to modify or extend Jay’s Treaty,” EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app.
C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 273, at 337, the Senate Executive Journal suggests that King served as a resident ambassador
to the United Kingdom in pursuing that objective, rather than as an ad hoc agent. S. EXEC.
JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 209. I therefore excluded King from the list.
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8/21/1789

279

Method

President &
Senate

Rank

Commissioner

959

Purpose

Other Office Held

Treaty

Customs

negotiation

Collector of Port

(Southern

of

Indians)

Charlestown

Boston

and
280

Treaty
Cyrus Griffin

8/21/1789

President &
Senate

Commissioner

negotiation
(Southern

None

Indians)
Treaty
David

8/21/1789

Humphreys

President &
Senate

Commissioner

negotiation
(Southern

None

Indians)
Treaty
Henry Knox

281

8/6/1790

President &
Senate

Not listed

negotiation

Secretary of

(Creek

War

282

Indians)
Information

David
Humphreys

Thomas
Barclay

284

283

8/11/1790

President

Private agent

delivery

None

(Portugal)

5/13/1791

President
(recess)

285

Treaty
Consul

negotiation

None

(Algiers)

279. The 1789 appointments of Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, and David Humphreys are
not listed in Appendix C, but are documented at S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (2d Sess. 1789), at
19.
280. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 13.
281. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (2d Sess. 1790), at 57.
282. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 26.
283. This case was not listed in the Committee’s report but is documented at S. EXEC.
JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75.
284. No. 66: Morocco & Algiers (Dec. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 288.
285. The committee’s report does not identify recess appointments, so I identified them by
reference to a list of the session dates of Congress. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm [https://perma.cc/XR9MQM37].
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Appointment Appointment

Name

Date

William
Carmichael

William Short

3/18/1792

3/18/1792

John Paul Jones June 1792

Method

Rank

President &

Commissioner

Senate

plenipotentiary

President &

Commissioner

Senate

plenipotentiary

President
(recess)

Purpose
Treaty
negotiation
(Spain)
Treaty
negotiation
(Spain)

Lincoln

3/2/1793

President &
Senate

Chargé d’affaires
in Spain

Minister resident
in Netherlands

Treaty
Commissioner negotiation

Navy admiral

(Algiers)
Treaty

Benjamin

Other Office Held

negotiation
Commissioner (Wabash &
Illinois
Indians)

Customs
Collector of Port
of

Boston

Charlestown

and
286

Treaty
Beverly
Randolph

3/2/1793

President &
Senate

negotiation
Commissioner (Wabash & None
Illinois
Indians)
Treaty

Timothy
Pickering

287

3/2/1793

President &
Senate

negotiation
Commissioner (Wabash &
Illinois

Postmaster
General

288

Indians)
David
Humphreys

John Jay

William Short

3/21/1793

4/19/1794

7/11/1794

President

Commissioner

(recess)

plenipotentiary

President &

Envoy

Senate

extraordinary

President

Commissioner

(recess)

plenipotentiary

Treaty
negotiation
(Algiers)
Treaty
negotiation
(UK)
Treaty
negotiation
(Spain)

286. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 13.
287. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (3d Sess. 1793), at 135–36.
288. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (1st Sess. 1791), at 86, 88.

Minister resident
in Portugal

Chief Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court

Minister resident
in Spain
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Name

Date

Thomas

11/24/1794

Pinckney

Method

Rank

961

Purpose

Other Office Held

Treaty

Minister

negotiation

plenipotentiary to

(Spain)

Great Britain

President &

Envoy

Senate

extraordinary

President

Commissioner negotiation

Minister resident

(recess)

plenipotentiary (Barbary

in Portugal

Treaty
David

3/30/1795

Humphreys

Powers)
Employed by
Joseph
Donaldson

289

5/21/1795

David
Humphreys
(recess)

291

2/10/1796

290

David

negotiation

None

(Algiers)

Employed by

Joseph
Donaldson

Treaty
Agent

Treaty
Agent

Humphreys

negotiation
(Tripoli)

Consul at Tripoli
and Tunis

Treaty
Employed by
Joel Barlow

292

2/10/1796

David
Humphreys

negotiation
Agent

None

(Algiers,
Tripoli

&

Tunis)

Henry Knox

293

4/1/1796

President &
Senate

Boundary
Commissioner settlement

None

(UK)

289. See Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, 8 Stat. 133 (describing
Donaldson’s appointment); see also PETER P. HILL, JOEL BARLOW: AMERICAN DIPLOMAT AND
NATION BUILDER 42–46 (2012) (discussing Donaldson’s assignment).
290. See No. 109: Algiers (Feb. 15, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 528–29.
291. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796, 18 Stat. 755 (describing
the appointment).
292. See id. (same); see also HILL, supra note 289, at 41–73 (discussing Barlow’s assignment).
293. This case was not in the Committee’s report but is documented at S. EXEC. JOURNAL,
4th Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 204–05. The same is true of the contemporaneous cases of Thomas
Fitzsimons, James Innes, Christopher Gore, and William Pinkney. Id. These five individuals
served as commissioners under Jay’s Treaty, which explicitly required that their appointments
occur “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Treaty of Amity Commerce and
Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. 5–7, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 245, 249 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
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Appointment Appointment

Name

Date

Method

Rank

Purpose

Other Office Held

Creditor
Thomas

4/1/1796

Fitzsimons

President &
Senate

Commissioner

claim
settlements

None

(UK)
Creditor
James Innes

4/1/1796

President &
Senate

Commissioner

claim
settlements
(UK)

Attorney
General of
Virginia

Vessel
Christopher
Gore

4/1/1796

President &
Senate

Commissioner

capture
settlements

None

(UK)
Vessel
William

4/1/1796

Pinckney

President &
Senate

Commissioner

capture
settlements

None

(UK)
Timothy
Pickering

294

5/4/1796

President

Secretary

of

State

Treaty
negotiation
(UK)
Treaty

Abraham
Ogden

5/18/1796

295

President &
Senate

Commissioner

Secretary of State

negotiation
(Cohnawaga
Indians)

U.S. Attorney for
District of New
Jersey

296

Treaty
Isaac Smith

297

3/3/1797

President &
Senate

Commissioner

negotiation
(Seneca

None

Tribe)

This leaves only four cases of executive unilateralism: In 1791,
Washington designated David Humphreys to deliver confidential
instructions to the American chargé d’affaires at Madrid and a

294. No. 115: Great Britain (May 5, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 552.
295. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 208.
296. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 64–65.
297. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 229, 232.
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proposal regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations to the
prime minister of Portugal.298 In the mid-1790s, Secretary of State
Edmund Randolph authorized David Humphreys to employ consuls
Joseph Donaldson and Joel Barlow as treaty negotiators with the
Barbary Powers.299 And in 1796, Washington commissioned Secretary
of State Timothy Pickering to negotiate an explanatory article to Jay’s
Treaty, without first nominating Pickering to serve as a negotiator.300
These cases complicate the task of ascertaining the official
understanding because they seem to depart from the dominant
pattern—the Senate was in session in each case, but the president did
not seek advice and consent.
The question, then, is whether there is anything about these
appointments that might have led the Administration to conclude that
Senate confirmation was unnecessary. For two of the cases, the answer
seems apparent: First, Humphreys likely did not qualify as a public
minister under the law of nations. Unlike many of his contemporaries,
he served in secret.301 Vattel, among others, was clear in suggesting that
secret ministers whose diplomatic character was known to the receiving
government but hidden from the public at large were not public
ministers.302 Second, because the Senate had already confirmed
Pickering to a cabinet-level diplomatic office,303 there is a fair argument
that additional advice and consent was unnecessary. Indeed, it has long
been accepted that a separate appointment is unnecessary when
Congress tasks an incumbent officer with new duties that are

298. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75.
299. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2235–36 (1797).
300. See No. 115: Great Britain (May 5, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 552 (entrusting Pickering with the “full power . . . to
negotiate and agree” on an explanatory article so as to rectify any misunderstandings about the
treaty in an “expedient” manner).
301. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75. (describing the mission as
“confidential”).
302. VATTEL, supra note 81, at 485 (“Sometimes princes send to each other secret ministers,
whose character is not public. If a minister of this kind be insulted by a person unacquainted with
his character, such insult is no violation of the law of nations.”); see also CALLIÉRES, supra note
205, at 68 (distinguishing “private [e]nvoys” from public envoys and defining the former as those
“who have only private Audiences of the Kings, or other Sovereigns, with whom they treat”
(emphasis omitted)); MARTENS, supra note 224, at 261 (using the term “secret embassy” to
describe the mission of a person sent abroad by a sovereign “to treat in secret of some affair of
importance or that requires dispatch, without giving him the quality of minister, or, at least,
without permitting him to assume it openly, till the object of his mission is out danger”
(capitalization modified from original)).
303. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 3d Cong. (2d Sess. 1795), at 193.
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“germane” to his or her original appointment.304 The Washington
Administration and Senate may have similarly reasoned that there is
no need for a separate confirmation process when the president assigns
to an incumbent diplomat additional duties that are germane to his
original post, or to diplomatic service more generally.
The cases of Donaldson and Barlow require more explanation. In
1793, the Washington Administration assigned Humphreys, its acting
minister resident in Portugal, to negotiate a peace treaty with
Algiers.305 Humphreys, however, was reluctant to carry out the mission
himself, so he requested the appointment of someone else to pursue
the negotiations in his stead.306 The Administration responded not by
appointing a new commissioner, but rather by granting Humphreys
authority to employ others to act on his behalf.307 Pursuant to this
authorization, Humphreys employed Joseph Donaldson, an obscure
official from the Treasury Department, and Joel Barlow, an old friend
who had been living in Paris, to negotiate with Algiers.308 Humphreys
also employed Barlow to negotiate treaties with Tripoli and Tunis, and
Barlow in turn delegated the negotiations with Tripoli to Richard
O’Brien, an American who had previously been held captive at
Algiers, and the negotiations with Tunis to a French merchant named
Joseph Stephen Famin.309 Around the same time, the Administration
sought and obtained Senate confirmation for the appointment of
Donaldson as consul at Tripoli and Tunis, and for the appointment of
Barlow as consul general at Algiers.310 But treaty negotiation is a classic
function of public ministers, not consuls, and the Administration did
not pursue an appointment of any kind for O’Brien or Famin. How can
we reconcile these cases with the rest?

304. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893) (“[W]e do not think that,
because additional duties, germane to the offices already held by them, were devolved upon them
by the act, it was necessary that they should be again appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.”); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1994) (applying this test).
305. Frank E. Ross, The Mission of Joseph Donaldson, Jr., to Algiers, 1795–97, 7 J. MOD. HIST.
422, 422 (1935).
306. The primary reason appears to have been concern about his personal safety. HILL, supra
note 289, at 37.
307. No. 109: Algiers (Feb. 15, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 528–29.
308. HILL, supra note 289, at 29–50.
309. Id. at 51–73; RICHARD B. PARKER, UNCLE SAM IN BARBARY: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
133–34 (2004).
310. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (Special Sess. 1795), at 179–80; S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 288.
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There are a few possibilities. Part of the answer seems to be that
the irregularities were just that—irregular, rather than evidence of a
constitutional norm. Additionally, it does not appear that the
Administration specifically authorized Barlow’s decision to rely upon
O’Brien and Famin.311 To that extent, Barlow’s action warrants little if
any weight as evidence of a broader understanding. Finally, the
Administration may have viewed Senate advice and consent to the
consular appointments as a sufficient substitute for advice and consent
to ministerial appointments. Both, after all, are procedurally identical
in giving the Senate an opportunity to vet nominees and comment on
their proposed assignments. In this sense, the cases of Donaldson and
Barlow do not demonstrate an early norm of executive unilateralism.
The Administration may have reasoned that, by designating these
agents as consuls, it could avoid signaling a normalization of relations
with the Barbary Powers while also respecting the Senate’s role in
foreign-affairs appointments.
In any event, Washington’s immediate successors followed the
broader pattern that he established. As shown in Table 2, John Adams
typically sought and obtained Senate confirmation for the sixteen ad
hoc diplomats that he appointed.312 The minority of cases in which he
acted on his own involved either a recess appointment or an individual
who was already serving abroad as a public minister.313 As shown in
Table 3, the same is true of Thomas Jefferson, who adhered to the
established pattern up through his last relevant appointment in 1806,314
the sole exception being the 1804 appointments of Daniel Smith and
Return Meigs as commissioners to negotiate a treaty of cession with
the Cherokee Indians,315 which I address below.
Many of these were high-profile cases. John Jay was serving as an
envoy extraordinary when he negotiated with Great Britain to

311. See PARKER, supra note 309, at 148–51.
312. This table is based on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s 1888 report. See S.
EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 273, at 337–38.
313. See id. (identifying the other offices held by appointed diplomats).
314. See id. at 338 (identifying diplomats appointed during Adams’s term); see also Letter
from William Pinkney to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 13, 1806), FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-3410 [https://perma.cc/RW2X-3XSH]
(discussing the assignment).
315. See No. 109: Cherokees and Others (Dec. 23, 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 699 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1832) (discussing the appointments of Smith and Meigs).
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conclude the treaty that came to bear his name.316 Ad hoc
appointments during the Adams Administration included Charles C.
Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry, whose joint commission
to negotiate with the French culminated in the notorious XYZ
Affair.317 And Thomas Jefferson nominated Robert Livingston and
James Monroe to negotiate the Louisiana Purchase.318 From a legal
perspective, this is sensible only if such individuals were understood as
both public ministers and officers of the United States under the
Appointments Clause.319

316. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 3d Cong. (2d Sess. 1794), at 152 (recording Senate approval of
Jay’s appointment as envoy extraordinary).
317. See No. 139: France (Apr. 3, 1798), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 153.
318. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st Sess. 1805), at 36–38.
319. The evidence also suggests a different way to think about the Senate’s original role in
treaty-making. There is a common narrative that although President Washington initially
obtained advice and consent by consulting the Senate on treaty content both prior to and after
negotiations, he quickly abandoned this practice and adopted the now-familiar approach whereby
the president seeks advice and consent only after the negotiations are complete. Jean Galbraith
has shown that this narrative overstates the speed with which the Washington Administration
moved away from the practice of prenegotiation advice and consent. See Jean Galbraith,
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 258–59 (2012). Yet it also overstates its
case by overlooking how Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson consistently sought advice
and consent in appointing treaty negotiators. This practice gave the Senate an additional
opportunity to influence how and even whether planned negotiations should proceed.
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Table 2: Ad Hoc Diplomats of the Adams Administration
Appointment Appointment

Name

Date

Method

Rank
Envoy

Charles C.
Pinckney

6/22/1797

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

John Marshall

6/22/1797

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

Elbridge Gerry 6/22/1797

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary

Rufus King

John
Adams

Quincy
321

1/3/1798

3/14/1798

President

President &
Senate

Minister
plenipotentiary

Purpose

Other Office
Held

Treaty
negotiation None

320

(France)

Treaty
negotiation None
(France)

Treaty
negotiation None
(France)
Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(UK)

Great Britain

Treaty

Minister

Commissioner negotiation plenipotentiary
(Sweden)

to Prussia

320. Appendix C seems to suggest that Charles Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry
jointly and severally held the office of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France
prior to and at the time of an additional set of ad hoc appointments in June of 1797. EXEC. REP.
NO. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 273, at 337. This is either an error or ambiguous drafting. The Senate
Executive Journal shows that President Washington appointed Pinckney as minister
plenipotentiary to France, with the advice and consent of the Senate, in late December of 1796.
S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1796), at 217. But the Journal does not identify Pinckney
as an “envoy extraordinary” in this initial appointment, id., and the appointment appears to have
terminated in February of 1797—roughly four months prior to Pinckney’s ad hoc appointment to
serve alongside John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry. See John LaFayette Brittain, Two Recently
Discovered Letters of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Another Glimpse into the Mind of an
Eighteenth Century Man of Affairs, 76 S. CAR. HIST. MAG. 12, 13 (1975) (discussing Pinckney’s
departure from France in February 1797). In addition, the Journal contains no record of
diplomatic appointments for John Marshall or Elbridge Gerry that predate the ad hoc
appointments of June 1797. I have modified Table 2 accordingly.
321. It appears that the President obtained the Senate’s advice and consent to this
appointment, but only after issuing full powers for Adams to negotiate. Compare No. 155: Prussia
(Dec. 6, 1799), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277,
at 250 (explaining, in an instruction dated July 15, 1797, that “full powers are herewith
transmitted” for Adams to negotiate with Sweden) with S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (2d Sess.
1798), at 265–66 (reporting that the Senate confirmed Adams on March 14, 1798).
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Appointment Appointment

Name

Date

Method

Rank

Purpose
Treaty

Richard

12/18/1798

O’Brien

322

President

Commissioner negotiation
(Tunis)

Other Office
Held
Consul general
at Algiers

Treaty
William Eaton 12/18/1798

323

President

Commissioner negotiation Consul at Tunis
(Tunis)

James

L.

Cathcart

Treaty
12/18/1798

324

President

Commissioner negotiation Consul at Tripoli
(Tunis)

Rufus King

2/7/1799

President &

Minister

Senate

plenipotentiary

Envoy
William
Smith

2/9/1799

325

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

Oliver

2/27/1799

Ellsworth

326

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

Patrick Henry

2/27/1799

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

William
Murray

327

Vans

2/27/1799

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(Russia)

Great Britain

Treaty
negotiation Minister pleni(Sublime

potentiary to

Ottoman

Portugal

Porte)
Treaty

Chief Justice of

negotiation U.S. Supreme
(France)

Court

Treaty
negotiation None
(France)

Treaty

Minister

negotiation resident in
(France)

Netherlands

322. See LANMAN, supra note 273, at 610–11 (reporting this appointment).
323. See id. (reporting this appointment).
324. See id. (reporting this appointment).
325. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (3d Sess. 1799), at 311–12.
326. Appendix C reports that the appointment occurred on February 26, 1799, but the Senate
Executive Journal makes clear that it occurred on February 27th. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong.
(3d Sess. 1799), at 318.
327. This negotiation concerned the settlement of a claim against the Netherlands for the
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Appointment Appointment
Date

Method

Rank
Envoy

William R.
Davie

6/1/1799

President
(recess)

328

extraordinary
& minister
plenipotentiary
Envoy

William R.
Davie

12/10/1799

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& minister
plenipotentiary

Rufus King

12/31/1799

President

Minister
plenipotentiary

969

Purpose

Treaty
negotiation
(France)

Treaty
negotiation
(France)
Treaty

Other Office
Held

Governor of
North Carolina

Brigadier
General

329

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary
(UK)

to Great Britain

unlawful seizure of an American ship and culminated in the nation’s first sole executive
agreement. See Letter from Maarten van der Goes to William Vans Murray (Dec. 7, 1799),
reprinted in 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1075–78 (Hunter Miller ed., 1937). This suggests an understanding that the Senate
confirmation requirement was not limited to Article II treaties.
328. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 6th Cong. (1st Sess. 1799), at 325–26.
329. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (2d Sess. 1798), at 292.
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Table 3: Ad Hoc Diplomats of the Jefferson Administration330
Appointment Appointment

Name

Date

Method

Rank

Purpose

Other Office
Held

Treaty
John Taylor

331

3/11/1802

President &
Senate

Commissioner

negotiation
(Six

None

Nations)

Rufus King

6/10/1802

President

Minister

(recess)

plenipotentiary
Minister

James Monroe 1/12/1803

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& plenipotentiary

Charles
Pinckney

332

Robert
Livingston

1/12/1803

1/12/1803

President &

Minister

Senate

plenipotentiary

President &

Minister

Senate

plenipotentiary
Minister

James
Monroe

334

1/12/1803

President &

extraordinary

Senate

& plenipotentiary

Rufus King

1/25/1803

President &

Commissioner

Senate

335

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(UK)

Great Britain

Treaty
negotiation None
(Spain)
Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
333

(Spain)

Spain

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(France)

France

Treaty
negotiation None
(France)
Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(UK)

Great Britain

330. As with Tables 1 and 2, I have resolved any discrepancies between Appendix C and the
Senate Executive Journal in favor of the latter, given that Journal entries were created closer in
time to the relevant appointments.
331. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (1st Sess. 1802), at 408–09.
332. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 432, 436.
333. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (1st Sess. 1802), at 404.
334. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 431.
335. Appendix C suggests that King was appointed as a minister plenipotentiary, but the
Senate Executive Journal shows that he was appointed as a commissioner. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL,
7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 432, 437.
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Date
336

11/18/1803

Method
President &
Senate

337

Rank

971

Purpose
Treaty

Commissioner

Other Office
Held
Consul-

negotiation general
(Tripoli)

for

Algiers

Treaty
Daniel Smith

338

4/4/1804

President

Commissioner

negotiation
(Cherokee

None

Indians)
Treaty
Return Meigs

4/4/1804

President

Commissioner

negotiation
(Cherokee

None

Indians)
Minister
James Monroe 10/14/1804

President
(recess)

339

extraordinary
&

plenipoten-

tiary
Commissioner
John
Armstrong

3/17/1806

President &

plenipoten-

Senate

tiary &
extraordinary
Commissioner

James Bowdoin 3/17/1806

President &

plenipoten-

Senate

tiary &
extraordinary
Commissioner

James Monroe 4/21/1806

President &

plenipoten-

Senate

tiary &
extraordinary
Commissioner

William
Pinkney

4/21/1806

President &

plenipoten-

Senate

tiary &
extraordinary

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(Spain)

Great Britain

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(Spain)

France

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(Spain)

Spain

Treaty

Minister pleni-

negotiation potentiary to
(UK)

Great Britain

Treaty

Maryland

negotiation Attorney
(UK)

General

340

336. LANMAN, supra note 273, at 610.
337. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 8th Cong. (1st Sess. 1803), at 452–53, 455.
338. The appointments of Smith and Meigs were omitted from the 1888 report.
339. Jefferson sought and obtained Senate confirmation for Monroe’s appointment once the
Senate reconvened a few weeks later. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 8th Cong. (2d Sess. 1804), at 471–74.
340. Appendix C seems to suggest that the ad hoc appointments of James Monroe and
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Two official opinions from members of Washington’s cabinet also
touched upon the issue of diplomatic appointments. Though their
relevance is more attenuated, these opinions are compatible with the
dominant pattern. First, in 1790, as Congress debated legislation to
fund the American diplomatic corps, Washington asked Jefferson for
his views on whether it would be permissible for the legislation to
dictate the ranks and destinations of those who would serve abroad.341
Jefferson responded that such provisions would be invalid. Because the
Constitution assigns to the president power over the “transaction of
business with foreign nations,” Congress has no authority to make
decisions about where to send diplomats or the rank with which to send
them.342 Jefferson acknowledged that Article II gives the Senate a role
in the making of treaties and appointments, but argued that such
powers “are to be construed strictly.”343 One might interpret such
language as evidence that Jefferson would have strictly construed the
term “public Ministers” in the Appointments Clause to exclude all ad
hoc diplomats, thus denying the Senate’s power to confirm them.344
This, however, assumes there was sufficient uncertainty about the
status of ad hoc diplomats to render such a construction plausible. The
evidence discussed above suggests otherwise. Jefferson’s opinion,
moreover, used the seemingly expansive term “foreign Agent” as the
equivalent of “ambassadors[,] other public ministers[,] and consuls,”345
and in doing so left open the possibility that the Appointments Clause

William Pinkney occurred during the recess of the Senate, and that both individuals were at the
time already serving as minister plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom. EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app.
C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 273, at 338. The Senate Executive Journal, however, suggests that this is substantially
incorrect. While the Journal makes clear that James Monroe was minister plenipotentiary to the
United Kingdom at the time of his additional appointment, S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1806), at 35, William Pinkney did not become minister plenipotentiary to the United
Kingdom until 1808, S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 10th Cong. (1st Sess. 1808), at 71. In addition, the Journal
shows that the Senate confirmed both nominations. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st Sess. 1806),
at 35.
341. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 305–06 (discussing these events).
342. Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments
(Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 30 NOVEMBER 1789 TO 4 JULY 1790,
at 378–82 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
343. Id.
344. Cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 309–10 (suggesting this interpretation).
345. Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments,
supra note 342, at 378–79 (“The Constitution . . . gives the nomination of the foreign Agent to the
President, the appointment to him and the Senate jointly, the commissioning to the President.”).
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requires Senate confirmation for a wide variety of foreign
representatives.
Second, Attorney General William Bradford touched upon the
meaning of public ministers in a 1794 opinion addressing whether
rioting outside the house of the British consul in Norfolk, Virginia
violated the Crimes Act of 1790 as a form of “violence to the person of
an ambassador or other public minister.”346 According to Bradford, the
riot was not an offence within the meaning of the statute. A consul, he
explained, “is not considered [a public minister] by the writers on the
law of nations, because he is not in any degree invested with the
representative character; and it has, more than once, been judicially
determined that he is not entitled to the privileges attached to the
person of every public minister.”347 Thus, the statutory meaning of
“public minister” was a matter of international law, which defined the
term to refer to agents who represent the prince vis-à-vis foreign actors
(principally sovereign states). This definition would seem to include
many irregular envoys, who represented the president in matters
ranging from treaty negotiations to official ceremonies. Clearly,
Bradford’s opinion interpreted a statute rather than the Constitution,
but there is no evidence that the framers envisioned a different
approach to the Appointments Clause, which used the same
terminology, and as shown above, officials argued consistently that the
constitutional meaning of “public Ministers” hinges on the law of
nations.348
3. Debates in Congress. Early members of the House of
Representatives generally agreed that the appointment of ad hoc
diplomats, at least in the form of treaty negotiators, requires Senate
confirmation. For instance, in a 1789 debate over a bill providing for
the compensation of commissioners to negotiate a peace treaty with
the Creek Indians, participants uniformly endorsed the view that
advice and consent was necessary for the appointment of the
commissioners qua negotiators.349 According to Representative
Theodore Sedgwick, “no one ever doubted but the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, could employ what and as
346. Respect Due to Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 41, 42 (1794) (emphasis omitted) (quoting An
Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118
(1790)).
347. Id.
348. See supra notes 271–72 (citing examples).
349. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 716–30 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the debate).
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many negotiators as he pleased.”350 Representative Michael Stone
concurred: “There was no doubt entertained that the President, with
the Senate, might appoint the commissioners, and empower them to
negotiate.”351 Legislators expressed these views even though the
appointments in question were “a mere temporary expedient.”352
Other members of Congress took the same position months later in a
debate over a bill to authorize the creation of a contingent fund for
foreign relations.353
In a more subtle way, the same understanding also surfaced in an
important debate over the implementation of Jay’s Treaty. In March
of 1796, Representative Edward Livingston proposed a resolution

350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 721.
See 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, at 77 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994)
(statement of Rep. Laurance) (arguing that “there was a constitutional necessity that the
president, by and with the consent of the senate, should appoint all the officers employed in
foreign negociations; the same necessity existed with respect to making treaties”); id. at 79
(statement of Rep. Sherman) (“The establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the senate,
as does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business; these two objects are
expressly provided for in the constitution, and they lead me to believe, that the two bodies ought
to act jointly in every transaction which respects the business of negociation with foreign
powers.”). During this debate, Representative William L. Smith made an observation that has
attracted the attention of modern legal scholars. According to Smith:
Many officers may be established in the diplomatique line, without being concerned in
making treaties: A minister may reside twenty years in France without being employed
in the formation of any treaty whatever. A treaty may be negociated without the
intervention of any person in such a character; or a person may be employed distinct
from him, as was the case in the late commercial treaty between France and Great
Britain.
Id. at 79–80. Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey interpret this statement as evidence of an
original understanding that the president holds power to appoint “special envoys not confirmed
by the Senate.” Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 304. I disagree insofar as they use the term
“special envoys” to include anyone who would have qualified as a public minister under the law
of nations. My view is that when Representative Smith stated that a “treaty may be negociated
without the intervention of any person in such a character,” he was referring to the specific
character of a resident diplomat rather than the more general character of a public minister, and
was thus making the point that nonresident ministers can negotiate treaties, just like their resident
counterparts. From such a position, it does not follow that he believed in an independent
presidential power to appoint nonresident ministers as negotiators. This interpretation better
aligns with the overwhelming weight of the evidence, including the statements of other members
of Congress and the practice whereby early presidents consistently sought advice and consent for
the appointment of negotiators. See supra Tables 1–3; see also Powers of the Executive, 1 U.S.
Op. Att’y Gen. 65, 65–66 (1796) (concluding that the “President alone, and without the advice of
the Senate, cannot appoint a commissioner to hold or make a treaty with an Indian tribe” because
the authority of the United States “cannot be bestowed on any person but by the President, with
the advice of the Senate”).
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requesting that the President provide “a copy of the instructions to the
Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty . . . together
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said
Treaty.”354 Livingston and other Democratic-Republicans supported
this measure as a means of obtaining information that would help the
House to evaluate the treaty’s constitutionality, decide on the manner
of legislative implementation, and interpret unclear terms.355 They also
argued repeatedly that access to the records would facilitate a
determination on whether John Jay might have violated his negotiating
instructions, received improper gifts, or otherwise acted in a way that
would warrant impeachment.356 In making these arguments, the
legislators clearly assumed that Jay qualified as a public minister and
officer of the United States in his capacity as special envoy and
negotiator: The resolution itself described Jay as a “Minister,”357 and
participants uniformly referred to him as an “officer.”358 Moreover,
given the language of the Constitution, which provides only for the
impeachment of the “President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of
the United States,” the suggestion of even the mere possibility of
impeaching Jay qua negotiator necessarily relied on the premise that
he was an officer in that role.359 Over the course of an entire month of
discussion, opponents denounced the resolution repeatedly and on a
variety of grounds, including by arguing that there was no apparent
reason to believe that Jay had engaged in conduct that might warrant
impeachment.360 Not a single person, however, questioned that Jay
qualified as a public minister and officer, or that impeachment was a
theoretical option, even if unwarranted on the facts.361 Immediately
after the resolution passed, President Washington declined to provide
the requested documents, but not because he understood the
Constitution to preclude the impeachment of a special envoy as a type
of non-officer.362 Instead, he emphasized simply that the resolution had
failed to identify impeachment as its purpose.363

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

5 ANNALS OF CONG. 426 (1796).
See, e.g., id. at 426–27, 436, 448 (statements of Reps. Livingston, Gallatin, and Harper).
Id. at 427, 444, 446–47, 501, 556–57, 575, 601, 629.
Id. at 426.
See, e.g., id. at 427, 444 (statements of Reps. Livingston and Nicholas).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 646 (1796) (statement of Rep. Williams).
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id.
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One can only imagine that legislators operated on a similar
understanding when they passed the Crimes Act of 1790. As explained
above, this statute prohibited arrest and service of process against “the
person of any Ambassador or other public minister of any foreign
Prince or State authorised and received as such by the President of the
United States, or domestic or domestic servant of any such
Ambassador or other public minster.”364 Thus, if contemporaries
generally understood the term “public ministers” to exclude all special
envoys, the statute would have criminalized acts against resident
ministers—along with their servants—while categorically failing to
prohibit acts against special envoys. Such an interpretation seems
tenuous at best. There was “little reported debate” on the Act,365 but
there is no apparent reason to believe that its drafters desired such
differential treatment. Because both categories of diplomats were
protected by the law of nations, and because acts against either could
easily complicate foreign relations,366 the most sensible conclusion is
that legislators understood the statutory protection as applicable to
resident and irregular envoys alike.
To be clear, Congress did not view involvement in work of an
international character as independently sufficient to qualify an
individual as a public minister, and this was true even when the work
was to be performed at the arrangement of the U.S. government. Most
legislators appear to have been comfortable with the idea that
something more was necessary to trigger the requirement of advice and
consent. This much was apparent in early 1796, when the House of
Representatives debated a bill authorizing the appointment of agents
to travel abroad and provide relief and protection to American sailors
who had been seized on the high seas.367 The task of these agents was
threefold:
[1] to inquire into the situation of such American citizens or others,
sailing, conformably to the law of nations, under the protection of the
American flag, as have been, or may hereafter be impressed or
detained by any foreign power; [2] to endeavor, by all legal means, to
obtain the release of such American citizens or others, as aforesaid;
[and 3] to render an account of all impressments and detentions

364. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112 (spelling modified from original).
365. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,
1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 828 (1994).
366. See supra Part III.A.
367. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 802–21 (1796).
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whatever, from American vessels, to the executive of the United
States.368

Given these purposes, a number of legislators opposed the bill on the
view that the agents would be public ministers whose appointments
required Senate advice and consent but not statutory authorization.369
The majority, however, rejected this position. As James Madison
explained, “the agents proposed to be appointed in th[e] bill were
neither Ambassadors, public Ministers, nor Consuls.”370 The majority
concurred in light of the nondiplomatic nature of the mission.371
Representative William Giles, for example, emphasized that the agents
were not public ministers because “[t]hey would not have the smallest
relation to foreign Powers; they would be appointed to attend to their
own citizens, and the only thing in which they could have any
resemblance to Ministers was their residence in a foreign country.”372
Operating on this premise, the House passed the bill creating the
offices in question.373
4. Early Dictionaries. Early American dictionaries suggest that
popular usage approximated the official understanding. None of these
particular sources appear to have included a separate entry for “public
minister,” but they identified one meaning of “minister” as the
functional equivalent and did so in a way that seemed to include a wide
variety of actors.374 For instance, William Perry’s Royal Standard
English Dictionary defined “minister” simply to be “an agent from a
foreign power.”375 More precisely, Noah Webster’s American
Dictionary of the English Language defined “minister” to mean “[a]
delegate; an embassador; the representative of a sovereign at a foreign
court; usually such as is resident at a foreign court, but not restricted to
such.”376 This source is particularly noteworthy because the Supreme
368. An Act for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 477 (1796).
369. See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 815, 817–18 (1796) (statements of Reps. Sitgreaves,
Murray, and Sedgwick).
370. Id. at 813.
371. See id. at 802–21 (reporting the debate).
372. Id. at 819; see also id. at 817, 820 (statements of Reps. Nicholas and Gallatin).
373. Id. at 820.
374. I limit the discussion to the two American dictionaries that are available online and
discussed in Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 386, 389–90
(2014).
375. Minister, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Worcester 1st Am. ed., 1788).
376. Minister, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).
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Court has cited it on a number of occasions as evidence of original
meaning,377 and because its definition of “minister” explicitly included
nonresident diplomats.378 Insofar as nonresident service equated with
ad hoc diplomacy, Webster’s dictionary corroborates the view that, as
a matter of popular understanding, there was no necessary durational
component to the office of public minister.
5. Additional Context. Finally, several background conditions
suggest that the framers would have viewed many unilateral
appointments as problematic. One is the nature of diplomatic
representation in the eighteenth century. Every indication is that both
resident and irregular representatives were known to wield significant
power. As many of the foregoing examples illustrate, they negotiated
treaties, mediated weighty matters of war and peace, and interfaced
with foreign heads of state. Predating both summit diplomacy and
international news media, they served as critical sources of information
for their sending governments.379 Predating the rise of diplomacy as a
profession in the United States,380 their appointments were viewed at
times in political and sectional terms.381 Moreover, given the state of
transatlantic communication in the late eighteenth century, when it

377. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (citing the American
Dictionary of the English Language in interpreting the Appointments Clause); see also Maggs,
supra note 374 at 389–90 (discussing the American Dictionary of the English Language as potential
evidence of original meaning).
378. Minister, supra note 376.
379. Cf. JENNIFER MORI, THE CULTURE OF DIPLOMACY: BRITAIN IN EUROPE, C. 1750–1830,
at 120–21 (2010) (discussing how the rise of ministerial diplomacy in the early nineteenth century
marginalized envoys by limiting their autonomous powers to make policy and their opportunities
to interface with heads of state).
380. BLACK, supra note 146, at 130 (explaining that the American diplomatic service
“retained a relatively amateurish approach until the reforms of the 1940s”).
381. The most salient example at the Founding was John Jay’s appointment to negotiate a
treaty with Spain in 1786. Sectional interests in the negotiations diverged sharply, with northern
states hoping to secure trade liberalization and southern states hoping to obtain a promise of
freedom of navigation on the Mississippi River. KLARMAN, supra note 120, at 48–69. After
encountering Spanish intransigence on the latter issue, Jay advocated for Congress to abandon
an instruction to insist upon freedom of navigation, and focus instead on obtaining a commercial
agreement. Id. at 56–58. This outraged southern leaders, who accused Jay—a New Yorker—of
sectional bias and proposed that the negotiation take place in Europe, “where they anticipated
that Jefferson, the minister to France, would do a better job than Jay of protecting southern
interests.” Id. at 65; see also GILBERT, supra note 137 at 80 (recounting how the Confederation
Congress appointed multiple agents to “a single diplomatic mission, in order to reflect the
differing opinions in Congress”); KAPLAN, supra note 139 at 123–25, 207–08 (discussing the
political orientations of early diplomats such as John Adams, Thomas Pinckney, and Thomas
Jefferson, and the influence of those orientations on their work).
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took weeks to transmit instructions, they were forced at times to make
important and controversial decisions without official guidance.382
Diplomats of all varieties thus played a critical role in the execution
and even the development of foreign policy. This context makes it
harder to imagine the framers dividing the power to appoint all
resident diplomats while granting to the president alone the equally
significant and in many ways functionally identical power to appoint all
special envoys. Such differential treatment would have likely been
viewed as arbitrary, given the significance of many ad hoc assignments
and the purposes of the Appointments Clause.
Another condition is the nature of early consular work. Duties
included reporting political and commercial intelligence to the
Secretary of State, notifying U.S. merchants of the advent of war,
receiving protests on maritime matters, helping to settle the estates of
Americans who died abroad, and assisting stranded or shipwrecked
vessels and their crews.383 It is difficult to imagine why the framers
would have cared to subject the appointments of these officers to a
requirement of Senate confirmation, but not the appointments of
special envoys responsible for such consequential tasks as negotiating
treaties and communicating with heads of state. Counter-intuitively,
the orthodox view has the framers categorically subjecting some
mundane appointments to shared authority while permitting the
president alone to make many appointments of great significance.384
Lastly, consider again the original trepidation over foreign
relations. As explained earlier,385 some of the most influential framers
viewed diplomatic relations as a risky endeavor and something to be
undertaken with great care, if not avoided altogether.386 It seems
382. BLACK, supra note 146, at 97, 120; LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY
128–30 (1948).
383. See Letter XLI—Circular to Consuls (Aug. 26, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 6 JULY – 3 NOV. 1790, at 423–25 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) (discussing consular
duties); see also An Act Concerning Consuls and Vice-Consuls, §§ 2–7, 1 Stat. 254, 255–56 (1792)
(same).
384. As Jennifer Mascott has shown, there is substantial evidence that the original
understanding of “Officers of the United States” also extended to positions with even less
responsibility than consuls, such as account-keeping clerks, certain personnel tasked with customs
enforcement, lieutenants in the military, and interpreters. See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who
are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018). This understanding would seem
to render unilateral diplomatic appointments even more problematic, given the importance of the
work in question.
385. See supra Part III.A.
386. This sentiment was influential—even if less than universally held—throughout the
Founding era. For example, in early 1798, members of Congress engaged in an extended debate
IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
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plausible and even likely that those who held this concern would have
preferred to subject diplomatic appointments of all kinds to the shared
authority of the president and the Senate. To permit the president to
make unilateral appointments of the ad hoc variety would have been
to remove a significant procedural restraint on the risk of entanglement
with European and other powers.
F. Responding to the Orthodox View
For the most part, analyses in favor of unilateral ad hoc diplomacy
simply ignore the evidence presented above. Even while arguing in part
on the basis of original meaning, neither OLC nor commentators have
acknowledged the significance of the Diplomatic Privileges Act of
1708, Barbuit’s Case, writers such as Wicquefort, early dictionaries, the
pattern whereby presidents submitted most special diplomatic
appointments to the Senate, or the background conditions that would
have made this pattern normatively attractive. The evidence cited in
favor of unilateral appointments is incomplete at best.
That evidence, moreover, is problematic even on its own terms.
Consider this: In 1789, President Washington designated Gouverneur
Morris to undertake a mission to London, where Morris was to inquire
informally about British intentions to comply with certain provisions
of the Treaty of Paris, the possibility of negotiating a treaty of
commerce, and the future commissioning of a resident minister to the
United States.387 OLC characterizes this appointment as evidence of an
early understanding that an office is a position with continuance or
duration.388 Yet that interpretation disregards the majority of cases in
which Washington sought advice and consent for the appointment of

over a proposed measure to reduce appropriations for the salaries of certain American diplomats.
See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 848–945, 1083–1216 (1798); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1217–34 (1798). One
of the primary questions was whether it was constitutional for the House of Representatives to
utilize its appropriations power to control the president’s ability to dispatch public ministers.
While the participants disagreed on the resolution of this question, several congressmen on both
sides concurred that maintaining diplomatic relations with European powers was generally
dangerous and less than ideal. A number opined that the United States would be better off
without any public ministers. See, e.g., 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 851–53, 886, 906, 916–18, 930, 933,
1088 (1798).
387. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 102; 1 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 339–47 (Boston, Gray &
Bowen 1832) (describing the mission in detail).
388. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 102.
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ad hoc negotiators.389 The conclusion that better aligns with early
practice is that Washington appointed Morris on his own authority
because Morris was not understood to be a public minister. In
describing the mission, the President emphasized that Morris would
proceed as a “private Agent” rather than in a public capacity to reduce
the “risk of humiliation for the administration if the British refused to
negotiate.”390 As explained above, a number of influential
commentators took the position that such agents were not public
ministers insofar as their diplomatic character was hidden from the
public at large.391
As “[t]he most prominent early example” in favor of its position,
OLC also has highlighted a statement in which Alexander Hamilton
argued that the President held independent power to appoint
commissioners to resolve claims under the Treaty of Paris.392
According to Hamilton, the Appointments Clause did not apply to the
commissioners because they were “not in a strict sense officers,” but
rather “arbitrators” between the United States and Great Britain.393
Yet OLC omitted a critical fact: President Washington sought and
obtained Senate confirmation for the treaty commissioners only two
months after Hamilton had argued against it.394 Hamilton’s argument
did not prevail.
It is possible, of course, that Washington submitted these
nominations merely as a political courtesy, but the more sensible
explanation seems to be that the Administration viewed Senate
confirmation as constitutionally required. This interpretation is
consistent with the broader confirmation trends identified above, and
with evidence that commissioners under the Treaty of Paris understood

389. See supra Table 1.
390. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Oct. 13, 1789), in 4 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, SEPTEMBER 1789–JANUARY 1790, at 179–83
n.1 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993).
391. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (citing sources).
392. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 103.
393. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 20 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974)); see also The Constitutional
Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, supra note 61, at 146 & n.67 (citing
Hamilton’s statement as the principal example of a “long historical pedigree” for the notion that
“members of multinational or international entities who are not appointed to represent the
United States” need not be confirmed by the Senate, “[a]t least where th[ose] entities are created
on an ad hoc or temporary basis”).
394. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1796), at 204.
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themselves as public ministers. Shortly after Christopher Gore and
William Pinkney arrived in London to arbitrate claims in 1796, the
British government ordered one of them to pay import duties on
certain items.395 The law of nations clearly exempted public ministers
from payment, but the British government asserted that the
commissioners failed to qualify for the exemption because they “ha[d]
no letters of Credence to His Majesty, and ha[d] not been received by
His Majesty with the formalities usually practised on the reception of
foreign public Ministers.”396 On this view, Gore and Pinkney were
present merely “in the character of American citizens, resident in
[Great Britain] under the protection of the American Minister, though
invested by the United States with the character of Commissioners for
a special purpose, under the stipulations in the [Treaty of Paris].”397
Gore and Pinkney disagreed. In a detailed response that cited
international legal authorities such as Wicquefort and Vattel, the
commissioners argued that they were entitled to the duties exemption
because a person may be “a public minister, under whatever name,
title, or style he may be authorized and commissioned, altho’ he have
no letters of credence to the sovereign, or be not received by him, with
any particular formalities.”398 To qualify, one needed only “a letter of
credence, a power, or some commission from the sovereign of a
country”; “acknowledg[ment] and allow[ance] by the sovereign of the
country to which he was sent in the character communicated by his
commission”; and an entrustment “to transact public affairs or business
between nation and nation.”399 Gore and Pinkney ultimately
acquiesced to the British demand, but only for the sake of relations,
and without retreating in principle from their original legal position.400
OLC has further relied upon President Jefferson’s unilateral
appointment of Daniel Smith as evidence that a diplomatic position
“must have continuance or duration” in order to qualify as an office.401
395. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 345 (Washington,
Government Printing Office 1898).
396. Report by the Queen’s Advocate and the Law Officers of the Crown (Dec. 22, 1796), in
FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY-MAKING
PROCEDURE 178 (J. Mervyn Jones ed., 1946).
397. Id.
398. 1 MOORE, supra note 395, at 348 (quoting from the response).
399. Id. This is John Bassett Moore’s paraphrase of the contents of the response, a copy of
which I was unable to locate.
400. Id.
401. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

AD HOC DIPLOMATS

1/17/2019 5:24 PM

983

According to OLC, Smith’s appointment was a “striking” case because
he was a U.S. Senator who “did not vacate his seat” prior to acting as
a treaty commissioner.402 On this account, Smith’s dual position as a
Senator and commissioner demonstrates that the position of treaty
commissioner did not qualify its occupant as an “Officer of the United
States,” for if it had, Senator Smith would have violated the
Incompatibility Clause, which provides that “no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office.”403
The problem with this treatment is that it frames as representative
a case that was instead aberrational. Smith’s appointment was directly
contrary to the practice of President Washington, who sought and
obtained Senate confirmation for the appointment of Isaac Smith to
negotiate a treaty with the Seneca Tribe in 1797.404 The appointment
also contradicted an official opinion from Washington’s Attorney
General, Charles Lee, who explained that “the President alone, and
without the advice of the Senate, cannot appoint a commissioner to
hold or make a treaty with an Indian tribe.”405 It contradicted the views
of members of the First Congress.406 And it was squarely at odds with
the dominant practice of President Adams and President Jefferson
himself, who sought advice and consent for treaty negotiators on
virtually every occasion.407 The best reading of the evidence in context
is that Smith’s position as a commissioner made him a public minister
and officer of the United States, and that President Jefferson acted in
contravention of precedent by making the appointment on his own
authority.
It is unclear why no one objected. Chronology, however, seems to
explain why no one objected specifically on the grounds of the
Incompatibility Clause. President Jefferson commissioned Smith in
late April 1804,408 and Smith concluded the negotiations on one of
note 16, at 102.
402. Id.
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also generally Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & the
Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59 (2014) (arguing
that “Office under the United States,” as used in the Incompatibility Clause, encompasses
“Officers of the United States,” as used in the Appointments Clause, and covers appointed
officers in the executive branch).
404. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 229.
405. Powers of the Executive, supra note 353, at 65.
406. See supra Part III.E.3.
407. See supra Tables 1–3.
408. See Papers of Gen. Daniel Smith, 6 AM. HIST. MAG. 213, 233 (1901); see also No. 109:
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three treaties with the Cherokees in October of the same year.409 Both
of these developments preceded Smith’s election as a Senator in late
1804.410 To be sure, Smith negotiated the two remaining treaties in
October 1805,411 several months after the commencement of his term
as a Senator, which began on March 4, 1805,412 but Congress did not
convene until December of 1805, over a month after he completed the
negotiations.413 Given these circumstances, it is plausible that no one
even noticed the problem. I came across no evidence that members of
Congress or the Administration anticipated Smith’s election at the time
of his original appointment as commissioner, or that he missed any
votes or hearings as a Senator because of the earlier assignment.
Advocates of the orthodox view seem to have misinterpreted
other evidence, as well. In an undated memorandum, James Madison
explained that “[t]he place of a foreign Minister or Consul is not an
office in the constitutional sense of the term,” as it is “not created by
the Constitution” and “is not created by a law authorized by the
Constitution,” but is instead “created by the Law of Nations.”414
Wriston construed this statement as suggesting that all diplomatic
agents—whether resident or ad hoc—are non-officers and thus exempt
from the Appointments Clause.415 But that was almost certainly not the
point. Madison clearly understood that a public minister is an officer

Cherokees and Others (Dec. 23, 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 699 (describing Smith’s assignment).
409. See Carolyn Thomas Foreman, The Lost Cherokee Treaty, 33 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 238,
238 (1955) (recounting the chronology of the negotiations).
410. See BEN PERLEY POORE, THE POLITICAL REGISTER AND CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTORY: A STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE FEDERAL OFFICIALS, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
AND JUDICIAL, OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776–1878, at 29 (Boston, Houghton,
Osgood & Co. 1878).
411. No. 108: Wyandots and Others, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 698.
412. Smith, Daniel, (1748-1818), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., 1774–
PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000524 [https://perma.cc/
PY84-9GCB].
413. Compare No. 108: Wyandots and Others, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 698 (reporting a treaty-conclusion date of October 27, 1805),
with Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 285 (reporting that the first session of the Ninth
Congress commenced on December 2, 1805).
414. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the
Senate, supra note 272, at 91 n.1.
415. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 159 (responding to Madison’s assertion: “but it is not true that
diplomatic officials are not officers in the strict constitutional sense. Article II, Section 2, of the
Constitution calls them officers, and differentiaties them from others which are to be established
by law”).
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whose appointment requires advice and consent; the Constitution says
so explicitly.416 In writing that the place of a public minister or consul is
“not an office in the constitutional sense of the term,” Madison more
likely meant simply that the Constitution does not supply the criteria
by which to determine whether diplomatic agents qualify as officers for
purposes of the Appointments Clause. Those criteria depend instead
upon the definition of “public minister” under the law of nations.417
Under this reasoning, the eventual Hartwell line of cases and OLC
opinions that defined “officers of the United States” by reference to
purely domestic legal considerations such as “continuation” are
irrelevant, even if applicable in other contexts.
Of course, the executive branch has also characterized the
Appointments Clause as at least partly inapplicable on the view that
many ad hoc diplomats are not “public Ministers,” who must be
“formally accredited to . . . foreign governments as official diplomatic
representatives of our government,” but rather “personal
representatives of the President.”418 The 1943 memorandum that
appears to stand as the only official, public explanation of this position,
however, does not purport to rely on original meaning,419 and would
have encountered difficulty if it had: Wicquefort explained that
credentials are, while generally required, unnecessary where a
receiving sovereign acknowledges an agent as a public minister,420 and
the Washington Administration appears to have internalized this
position.421 Moreover, the 1943 memorandum does not purport to
justify the unilateral appointment of ad hoc diplomats who wield
transactional authority as U.S. officials.422

416. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
417. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the
Senate, supra note 272, at 91 n.1.
418. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra
note 48, at 457.
419. See id.
420. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining that the class of “public minister” includes
“those Persons whom Princes employ by a verbal Order; provided that he, with whom they are to
negociate, acknowledges ‘em in that Quality, and gives them a Credit which he would not give to
another without Letters”).
421. See supra Part III.E.2.
422. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra
note 48, at 457 (acknowledging that the terms “Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers” refer
to those who have been “formally accredited to . . . foreign governments as official diplomatic
representatives of our government”).
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G. Questions of Scope
Even accepting that advice and consent is generally required for
the appointment of irregular diplomatic agents, the historical record
leaves uncertainty regarding that requirement’s precise contours.
Three issues stand out.
First, there is a marginal uncertainty of breadth: what types of
diplomatic functions trigger the status of public minister? Substantial
evidence suggests that treaty negotiation and other types of official,
public, and intergovernmental representation qualify regardless of
duration, but there is no evidence on ad hoc representation vis-à-vis
international organizations, which simply did not exist in the
eighteenth century.
Second, there is a marginal uncertainty of depth: how far down an
organizational chart does the status of public minister extend? In terms
of rank, special envoys and lead negotiators qualify, given their close
comparability in status to those who received Senate confirmation
during early presidential administrations,423 but modern diplomacy
tends to rely on personnel with much greater diversity of ranks and
titles. Whereas John Jay single-handedly represented the United States
in negotiating with the British in 1794,424 a modern trade negotiation,
to name just one example, might entail diplomatic communications by
not only the U.S. Trade Representative, but also one or more Deputy
U.S. Trade Representatives, the Chief of Staff, the Senior Advisor, the
General Counsel, and various Associate General Counsels in the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.425 The proper treatment of
these and other modern titles is not self-evident under an originalist
framework.
Finally, there is a marginal uncertainty of frequency: if the
president seeks to rely upon an individual to conduct separate
negotiations with multiple foreign governments over a period of
months or years, how often, if ever, must he go back to the Senate for
fresh advice and consent? Returning to the example of trade, must
Donald Trump obtain Senate confirmation for Robert Lighthizer and
his deputies in advance of each new trade negotiation, or is a single
appointment sufficient? In combination, these questions create the
423. See supra Tables 1–3.
424. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 203
17, 232 51 (1923).
425. See Biographies of Key Officials, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/biographies-key-officials [https://perma.cc/ZL2H-4PHQ].
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possibility of substantial variation in the ambit of the Appointments
Clause, even if one operates within originalist parameters.
On these issues, the case for broader Senate involvement relies
more heavily on interpretive judgment and translation, but is far from
implausible. Begin with breadth. Because the early evidence is largely
silent on the issue of representation vis-à-vis international
organizations, it is fair to question whether the original understanding
of the Appointments Clause can encompass ad hoc diplomacy
involving the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, or
other, similar organizations. If it does not, then advice and consent is
necessary at most for appointments involving representation to foreign
states.
Yet the condition of the evidence is most likely a result of the
absence of multilateral institutions at the time of the Founding, rather
than a specific intent for public ministerial functions to exclude
anything other than bilateral, international diplomacy. Indeed, in the
case that most closely approximated contemporary appointments to
international organizations—the appointment of claim commissioners
under the Treaty of Paris—the Washington Administration sought and
obtained the Senate’s advice and consent.426 Some disagreed that the
commissioners were public ministers, but this view did not prevail
within the Administration,427 and context suggests a potential
explanation: Insofar as he delimited the functions of public ministers
by reference to the character of the foreign audience or receiving
entity, Wicquefort did so in broad terms. Most notably, he explained
that although “Sovereigns send their Embassadors only to
Sovereigns,” they can also send ambassadors to “Assemblies compos’d
of several representing Ministers.”428 While superficially contradictory,
Wicquefort treated these ideas as consistent on the view that
ambassadors sent to multilateral assemblies “are in reality sent to the
Sovereigns” represented by those in attendance.429
The practice for public ministers below the rank of ambassador
was even more permissive: “Sovereigns send Ministers sometimes to
those Places where their Interest requires it, notwithstanding there is
no Sovereign there for them to consider.”430 Thus, to name just one

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See supra Part III.E.2.
Id.
WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 45 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted)
Id.
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example, “France . . . had a Resident [public minister] at Hamburgh,
not for any Affairs it had to adjust with the Magistrate, nor to facilitate
the Correspondence it had with Sweden, but upon other particular
Considerations.”431 An approach that emphasizes this evidence would
honor Founding-era concerns about foreign entanglement by erecting
a broader barrier against executive unilateralism, without regard for
the organizational character of the recipient. It would also explain why
the Washington Administration repeatedly sought Senate
confirmation in appointing individuals to negotiate treaties with native
tribes that many regarded as inferior to sovereign states.432
Next consider the issue of depth. Because early administrations
sought advice and consent only for principal negotiators, it is
questionable whether positions of lesser authority also qualify as public
ministers as a matter of original meaning. Yet there are several reasons
to believe they can: Wicquefort opined that the term “public ministers”
encompassed
a
diversity
of
actors,
including
“plenipotentiaries . . . internuncios,
envoys,
residents,
agents,
commissioners, the secretaries of embassies, and even the secretaries of
embassadors.”433 The framers, moreover, chose to require Senate
confirmation for the appointment of consuls, who exercised relatively
limited authority.434 And to the extent that early presidential
administrations deployed teams of negotiators, they regularly sought
and obtained advice and consent separately for each and every
negotiator, even though some inevitably played less significant roles
than others.435 Together, this evidence suggests that the status of public
minister extends below the ranks of chief negotiators and other toplevel envoys.
Now consider the issue of frequency. During early
administrations, it was uncommon for the president to rely upon a
single appointee to negotiate multiple, separate agreements with
different foreign governments, and to that extent, it was also
uncommon for the president to seek fresh advice and consent in
advance of a current appointee’s negotiation of a new agreement.436 In
part for this reason, Michael Ramsey has argued that transaction431. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 45–46 (citing other examples).
432. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 567–68 (1823) (acknowledging the view that
native tribes are less than fully sovereign and citing to supporting authority).
433. Id. at 2 (emphasis altered and added) (capitalization modified from original).
434. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
435. See supra Tables 1–3.
436. Id.
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specific appointments are unnecessary to honor the original
understanding.437 In his view, it is sufficient for the president to make a
single appointment conferring general powers of negotiation.438
Ramsey’s position is not unreasonable, but seems to overlook
relevant considerations. One is that an approach that permits general
powers of negotiation is harder to justify in view of historical
constraints on states’ discretion to ratify agreements. Several leading
writers on the law of nations held that treaty signature triggers an
obligation to ratify as long as the negotiator followed his instructions
in drafting the text.439 This principle operated in considerable tension
with Article II’s provision for Senate advice and consent in the making
of treaties, which is meaningful only if discretionary, but there is
evidence that early U.S. officials were familiar with and at times
invoked the principle anyway.440 If that evidence reflects a broader
Founding-era acknowledgement of the obligation to ratify—either as a
binding rule of international law or as a moral precept by which to
satisfy the expectations of European governments—then it is at least
plausible that the founders perceived meaningful Senate involvement
at the front end of the adoption process as the best opportunity for
Congress to shape U.S. treaty obligations. It is precisely that
involvement, however, that the conferral of general negotiating
authority would render less frequent. To be sure, it is possible that the
founders would have nevertheless accepted such as practice, but doing
so would have further marginalized a Senate that already faced
considerable international constraints on its discretion to advise and
consent to ratification.
In addition, a requirement of transaction-specific advice and
consent would seem to better serve the original purposes of the
Appointments Clause.441 Professor Ramsey’s argument seems to
suggest that a single act of advice and consent could suffice regardless
of the number, content, importance, and foreseeability of the
agreements the appointee might negotiate, and regardless of the

437. Michael Ramsey, Ryan Scoville on Renegotiating NAFTA, ORIGINALISM BLOG (May 2,
2017),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2017/05/ryan-scoville-onrenegotiating-naftamichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/F9HS-NNYG].
438. Id.
439. See John Eugene Harley, The Obligation to Ratify Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 392,
398–400 (1919) (summarizing the views of early commentators).
440. See id.
441. See supra Part III.E.1 (discussing evidence of the Appointments Clause’s original
purpose).
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succession of foreign governments with which the appointee negotiates
and the domestic and international implications of those negotiations.
But this would make it much harder for the Senate to vet nominees for
competency. It would also complicate the task of policing for conflicts
of interest. And it would limit opportunities for public debate over
important questions of foreign policy.
Unsurprisingly, then, an approach that permits general advice and
consent does not appear to be the original model. In the late eighteenth
century, the president did not nominate and the Senate did not approve
the appointment of any individual to exercise roving, general authority
to negotiate treaties. Instead, the Senate approved the designation of
each negotiator shortly prior to each new negotiation.442 Moreover, the
Senate did this even when it had already confirmed the same individual
to a different but ongoing diplomatic appointment.443 This approach
enabled Senators to advise and consent to the appointments in an
informed manner, with a specific negotiation in mind. True, the
Constitution does not specifically say that such case-by-case approval
is necessary, and the mere existence of a pattern of early practice does
not necessarily mean that the founders understood it as constitutionally
required. But this practice was not merely occasional. It was the custom
throughout the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson,
and it manifested in relation to over two dozen international
negotiations.444 It is hardly a stretch to imagine that the practice would
have acquired a certain normative gravity in these circumstances, such
that departures would have been viewed with suspicion and even
opposed on constitutional grounds.
In summary, there is ample reason to believe that the dominant
narrative about the original understanding of ad hoc diplomacy is
incorrect. A substantial collection of evidence—virtually all of it
ignored by those who espouse the orthodox view—suggests three
essential conclusions: First, the framers generally understood the term
“public Ministers,” as used in the Appointments Clause, exclusively by
reference to the law of nations. Second, the law of nations defined
public ministers to include both resident and various types of irregular
diplomats. Most clearly, public ministers included the chief negotiators
of international agreements and any others who officially and publicly
represented the sovereign abroad, regardless of the duration of the
442. See supra Tables 1–3 and accompanying text.
443. See supra Part III.E.2.
444. See supra Tables 1–3.
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position or the precise nature of the diplomatic assignment, whether
that be transmitting or collecting information or merely attending a
ceremony. Third, the framers generally understood qualification as a
public minister under the law of nations as independently productive
of the status of “Officer of the United States,” and thus as triggering
the requirement of advice and consent. A nominee’s qualification for
officer status, in other words, was not an analytically separate
precondition to the need for Senate confirmation, but rather a simple
consequence of qualification as a public minister for the U.S.
government as a matter of international law. While there are
uncertainties on the margins, the constitutional argument against much
of the contemporary practice seems strong from an originalist
perspective.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
For nearly a century, scholars have taken it as given that the
Constitution empowers the president to dispatch all ad hoc diplomats
without the Senate’s advice and consent. OLC has also adopted this
position in recent years, relying in substantial part on evidence from
the Founding. The text of the Constitution, however, does not support
unilateral appointments, and an abundance of previously overlooked
evidence of original meaning squarely contradicts much of the
orthodox view.
These conclusions accentuate what was already a yawning chasm
between original and modern practice in treaty making. At the
Founding, it is now apparent, the dominant model was for the president
to seek advice and consent in appointing the negotiators, actively
consult with the Senate during the course of negotiations, and then
submit the finalized text for approval by two-thirds of the Senate,
which would in turn deliberate, possibly at length, on whether to grant
that approval.445 In contrast, consider the process involved in the illfated Trans-Pacific Partnership: President Obama independently
appointed all of the negotiators,446 strictly limited the ability of

445. See generally Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade in
the Constitutional Order, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1495 (2016) (discussing the significance of some of the
procedural differences between original and contemporary practice).
446. See Consultation With Stakeholders: An Integral Part of the Process, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Lead-Negotiators-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3N9D-4XNJ] (listing the members of the U.S. negotiating team for the TransPacific Partnership).
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members of Congress to even look at early drafts,447 and had planned
to submit the finalized text as a congressional-executive agreement that
requires only simple majorities of each house rather than two-thirds of
the Senate.448 Moreover, because Congress gave the president trade
promotion authority with respect to the TPP, legislators would have
had only a limited window within which to consider adoption and
would have lacked any ability to make amendments.449 For better or
worse, this is—from start to finish—a significant departure from
original design.450
A. Implications for Formalists
Of course, the significance of this analysis depends heavily on
one’s preferred approach to constitutional interpretation. For those
who give exclusive or primary weight to text, the analysis suggests that
a salient feature of contemporary U.S. foreign relations is generally
unconstitutional, and that, rather than act alone, the president must
obtain Senate approval in appointing anyone who would qualify as a
public minister under the historical law of nations. This includes the
principal negotiators of international agreements and likely includes
all other agents who officially and publicly interface with foreign
sovereigns on behalf of the United States, regardless of the duration of
their position, emoluments, or other Hartwell-esque criteria. From
such a perspective it follows that presidents have acted unlawfully by
independently appointing special envoys to work with foreign
governments on issues ranging from the resettlement of Guantanamo
detainees to Eurasian energy and peace in the Middle East.451 This
perspective also dictates that the method by which President Obama
appointed the primary negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and numerous other treaties is
447. Alleen Brown, You Can’t Read the TPP, But These Huge Corporations Can, INTERCEPT
(May 12, 2015, 1:36 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/12/cant-read-tpp-heres-hugecorporations-can [https://perma.cc/6PGY-LA7M].
448. Paul Lewis, Barack Obama Given ‘Fast-Track’ Authority Over Trade Deal Negotiations,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015, 6:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/24/barackobama-fast-track-trade-deal-tpp-senate [https://perma.cc/VLM4-JVFA].
449. Id.
450. The same is true of the equally ill-fated Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which
President Obama negotiated and adopted without congressional approval. Dave Boyer, Obama,
Chinese President Ratify Climate-Change Agreement, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/3/obama-xi-ratify-climate-change-agreement
[https://perma.cc/NDV6-K6E4].
451. See supra notes 30–43 (documenting cases).
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unconstitutional, and that President Trump has violated the
Appointments Clause by independently designating agents to
renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, orchestrate
the campaign to defeat ISIS, communicate with North Korea, pursue a
settlement between Israel and Palestine, or work toward the
stabilization of Ukraine.
It bears emphasis that, from an originalist perspective, the adviceand-consent requirement applies to the principal U.S. negotiators of an
international agreement regardless of the domestic process by which
the United States adopts the agreement itself. U.S. foreign relations
law has traditionally subdivided the instruments that qualify as treaties
under international law into three categories452: (1) Article II treaties
that require advice and consent from two-thirds of Senators present,453
(2) congressional-executive agreements that require simple-majority
approval from both houses of Congress, and (3) sole executive
agreements that require no congressional approval.454 The original
meaning of “public Ministers,” however, does not recognize these
distinctions.455 By seeking and obtaining Senate confirmation in
appointing the negotiators of both Article II treaties and sole executive
agreements, early presidents implied that the primary negotiator of an
international agreement will qualify for the statuses of public minister
and officer of the United States regardless of the agreement’s
classification under domestic law.456 From this perspective, the
legislative branch is currently underinvolved in the adoption of all

452. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”);
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 892–93 (discussing the traditional, domestic-law
classifications of U.S. treaties).
453. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
454. Daniel Bodansky and Peter Spiro recently argued that there is a fourth, previously
unrecognized category of “executive agreements+,” which they define as agreements that “are
supported but not specifically authorized by congressional action.” Bodansky & Spiro, supra note
28, at 887. Because the definition of “public Ministers” does not depend on the domestic process
by which the sovereign eventually adopts an agreement, it is likely that the requirement of Senate
confirmation would also apply to the principal U.S. negotiators of this additional category of
agreements.
455. See supra Part III.C (discussing the definition of “public Ministers” in the early treatises).
456. See supra Tables 1–3 and note 309 (reporting that early presidents regularly sought and
obtained Senate advice and consent for the appointment of Article II treaty negotiators, and for
the appointment of William Vans Murray, who negotiated the first sole executive agreement in
1799).
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types of international agreements, not just Article II treaties, and there
is no such thing as a “sole” executive agreement because the Senate
must always be involved, at a minimum, in the appointment of those
who would serve as its principal negotiators.
The formalist critique of unilateral appointments also offers fresh
insights on interim obligations. As a matter of international law, the
president’s unilateral act of signing an ex post congressional-executive
agreement or an Article II treaty triggers an obligation for the United
States to “refrain from acts which would defeat [the agreement’s]
object and purpose.”457 This obligation continues “until [the United
States] shall have made its intention clear not to become a party,”458 or
until the agreement’s entry into force, at which point the United States
assumes a more extensive obligation of performance in good faith.459
The precise nature of the interim obligation is a subject of
disagreement,460 but the doctrine has been invoked to justify a broad
range of policies461 and likely requires at least that the United States
refrain from “actions that would substantially undermine the ability of
the parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after
ratification.”462
Some commentators have suggested that this doctrine,
particularly in its more robust iterations, is constitutionally
problematic insofar as it empowers the president to assume certain
types of treaty obligations without any form of congressional
approval.463 The Appointments Clause complicates this analysis. On

457. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 452, at art. 18; see also, Frequently
Asked Questions: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/TA4X-3QKT] (explaining that
although the Senate has not provided advice and consent to the Vienna Convention, the United
States “considers many of the provisions of the . . . Convention . . . to constitute customary
international law on the law of treaties”).
458. Id. art. 18(a).
459. Id. art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith.”).
460. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties,
14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2003) (“As a matter of international law, core treaty obligations
attach . . . upon signature of the treaty.”); see also generally Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s
Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 283 (2001) (discussing divergent interpretations of the doctrine and proposing a separate test).
461. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 315–16 (2007) (discussing recent invocations of the doctrine).
462. Id. at 308.
463. Id. at 309 (arguing that “broad obligations arising from signature are in tension with the
U.S. constitutional process for making treaties”); David H. Moore, The President’s
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one hand, it accentuates the claim of executive unilateralism by
revealing that presidents often bypass the Senate in appointing those
who will shape the text of the agreement that the president will sign,
and in turn the interim obligations that flow from signature. On the
other hand, it suggests a plausible remedy: simple-majority advice and
consent. By obtaining Senate approval for the appointment of an
agreement’s chief negotiators, the president might effectively rebut
claims that interim obligations are unconstitutional as unilaterally
assumed. After all, no Senator who votes in favor of such an
appointment could plausibly disclaim the foreseeability of interim
obligations pending entry into force, and the bare requirement of
simple-majority approval from one house is plausibly commensurate
to the limited nature of the obligations themselves.
To be clear, none of this is necessarily to say that unilateral
appointments are categorically undesirable, or that any of the specific
policies that animate each case of ad hoc diplomacy are ill-advised.
Indeed, there are good arguments that special envoys generally do
important work, that the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have been
net-beneficial for the United States, that the Paris Agreement remains
an important part of the effort to mitigate climate change, and that the
United States would benefit if Congress had fewer rather than more
tools for obstructing the president’s conduct of foreign affairs. It is
conceivable, moreover, that an originalist approach to diplomatic
appointments would incentivize the president to circumvent the Senate
by making a larger portion of ad hoc appointments secret, thereby
precluding agents from qualifying as “public Ministers” even under the
original meaning of the term.464 This would likely interfere with
congressional involvement in foreign policy even more than the
orthodox view by not only depriving the Senate of the opportunity to
advise and consent to nominations, but also complicating congressional
oversight of active agents. But normative considerations are not
relevant to the present analysis. The point is simply that the practice of
appointing ad hoc diplomats without the Senate’s advice and consent
is, for better or worse, at odds with the Constitution’s text and, for
those who prioritize text, unconstitutional.

Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 613–32 (2012) (arguing that interim
obligations are unconstitutional regardless of the breadth of the doctrine).
464. See supra note 302 (identifying sources that exempted secret actors from the category of
“public minister”).
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Nor is this to say that extant treaties are invalid if they were
negotiated by unilaterally appointed agents. The Supremacy Clause
provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land only when made
“under the Authority of the United States.”465 In 1796, Attorney
General Charles Lee explained that this phrase refers to “the
constitutional authority of the United States, which . . . cannot be
bestowed on any person but by the President, with the advice of the
Senate.”466 From this position it would seem to follow that treaties
negotiated by individuals appointed without the Senate’s advice and
consent are not made under the authority of the United States, and are
thus ineligible for the status of supreme federal law. Yet the Supreme
Court would likely shy away from such a destabilizing outcome for at
least two reasons. The first is procedural: from an accountability
standpoint, one might fairly conclude that the president’s signature and
the Senate’s advice and consent expunge any constitutional defect
emanating from the appointment of the negotiators. The second reason
is precedential: In Buckley v. Valeo,467 the Court invalidated part of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as establishing an
unconstitutional method of appointment for members of the Federal
Election Commission, but then accorded “de facto validity” to the
members’ past acts.468 In Ryder v. United States,469 the Court suggested
that a similar result might pertain in other cases where necessary to
avoid “grave disruption or inequity.”470 One can only imagine that this
would apply to unconfirmed diplomatic appointments, the
unconstitutionality of which would otherwise render invalid scores of
international agreements.471
465. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
466. Powers of the Executive, supra note 353, at 66.
467. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
468. Id. at 142.
469. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
470. Id. at 185.
471. The constitutional infirmity of the agreements would likely fail to render them invalid as
a matter of international law. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a] person
is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a
treaty” if he or she “produces appropriate full powers” or “[i]t appears from the practice of the
States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as
representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers.” Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 452, at art. 7(1). Past negotiators of now-operative agreements
undoubtedly qualified as representing the United States under this language. Moreover, “[a] State
may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
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For an originalist, the analysis does, however, suggest avenues by
which Congress might attempt to reclaim influence over the future
conduct of foreign affairs. First, where the president proposes to
appoint irregular agents, the Senate might insist upon advice and
consent as an opportunity to publicly debate executive policies and, if
necessary, reject ad hoc appointments as a way of complicating and
discouraging those initiatives that appear fundamentally unsound. In
this regard, Section 301 of the Department of State Authorities Act,
Fiscal Year 2018 is well grounded.472 In proposing to require the
Senate’s advice and consent for the appointment of “any Special
Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special
Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special
Advisor,”473 the bill would merely resuscitate original practice. If the
president were to reject such an initiative, Congress might respond by
factoring that maneuver into its decisions on whether and how to
cooperate on related matters, including, in the event of a treaty or
other international agreement, the question of whether to approve any
resulting text.
Second, and more coercively, Congress might refuse to
appropriate funds for the compensation of envoys appointed without
advice and consent. “[I]t has long been established that the spending
power may not be deployed to invade core Presidential prerogatives in
the conduct of diplomacy,”474 but the foregoing analysis shows that, at
least for an originalist, unilateral appointments are typically not an
executive prerogative.
Third, in extreme cases, the House and Senate might impeach,
convict, remove, and disqualify from holding future office any ad hoc
diplomat who commits “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and

importance.” Id. art. 46(1). The Appointments Clause is almost certainly an “internal law of
fundamental importance,” but there is a strong argument that the violation is not “manifest,”
given the ubiquity of unilateral appointments by modern presidents. Cf. Jan Klabbers, The
Validity and Invalidity of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 561–64 (Duncan B.
Hollis ed., 2012) (explaining Article 46 in relation to “manifest” treaty violations). Thus, the
disruption associated with a declaration of unconstitutionality would likely stem from the
practical necessity to terminate or withdraw from operative treaties in order to resolve the
contradiction between their domestic and international validity, rather than from an automatic
invalidation of those treaties as a matter of international law. But either way, the damage to U.S.
foreign relations would be incalculable.
472. S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 301 (2017).
473. Id.
474. Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 189, 197
(1996).
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Misdemeanors.”475 Because impeachment is available only against the
“President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States,”476 the modern view has had the effect of immunizing ad hoc
diplomats from accountability as non-officers. The original
understanding, in contrast, would create the possibility of
impeachment by categorizing ad hoc diplomats as both public ministers
and officers of the United States. Under this approach, Congress might
consider the impeachment of Jared Kushner for allegedly engaging in
improper communications with Russia,477 just as the Fourth Congress
considered the impeachment of John Jay for alleged improprieties in
the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty.478
These measures would not be without functional logic. As shown
above,479 the unilateral method of appointment exacerbates other
forms of executive unilateralism. It makes possible “sole” executive
agreements in the fullest sense. It enables the president to assume
interim obligations with respect to treaties regardless of congressional
support. It eliminates many opportunities for Congress to scrutinize,
debate, and influence U.S. policy on topics ranging from arms control
to negotiations between Israel and Palestine. As a result, foreign policy
is less deliberative, less subject to compromise, and more vulnerable to
significant shifts based on the preferences of the White House. Many
have been comfortable with this state of affairs because they have
trusted, at least in basic terms, the character and judgment of most of
the individuals who have occupied the office of president, but that trust
is now in question.480 By insisting upon a return to the original practice,
the Senate might mitigate the contemporary dangers of executive
independence in foreign affairs.
Revitalizing the Appointments Clause would also make it harder
for the president to pursue the most extremely unqualified or
otherwise controversial appointments. Presidents face political
475. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
476. Id.
477. See Ryan Goodman, Can Jared Kushner Be Impeached?, JUST SECURITY (July 24, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/43463/jared-kushner-impeached [https://perma.cc/6MRK-CUSS].
478. See supra Part III.E.3.
479. See supra Part IV.
480. See Frank Newport, Americans Evaluate Trump’s Character Across 13 Dimensions,
GALLUP (June 25, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235907/americans-evaluate-trumpcharacter-across-dimensions.aspx [https://perma.cc/EK9A-5G7Y] (reporting that no more than
37% of Americans hold favorable views of President Trump’s honesty and trustworthiness,
likability, admirability, skill at choosing advisers and cabinet officers, and ability to work well with
both parties).
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incentives to make wise choices regardless of Senate involvement, and
yet, there is no guarantee that the current president or future
presidents will operate on informed, common conceptions of
competence or propriety. President Trump, after all, has
independently chosen his son-in-law, a real estate developer with zero
experience in international relations, to serve as one of his principal
representatives in the Middle East.481 If unilateral appointments are
permissible, there are no formal checks to preclude similar
appointments in the future. Admittedly, the Senate rarely turns down
unqualified nominees for diplomatic posts even when it has the
opportunity,482 but senators have used the confirmation power to reject
some of the most grossly unqualified nominees and encourage the
withdrawal of others.483 Moreover, the mere possibility of Senate
opposition plausibly strengthens the president’s incentive to avoid
controversial picks. A return to original practice would ensure that
these checks also operate with respect to many ad hoc appointees, and
thus encourage selections that satisfy generally accepted standards of
merit and facilitate an effective foreign policy.
B. Implications for Everyone Else
For those who reject the relevance of original meaning, the
implications are quite different. Insofar as modern customary practice
and other related considerations are significant, the analysis does not
resolve the question of constitutionality in any ultimate sense. Yet it is
still consequential for several reasons. One is that it shifts the burden
of persuasion to those who espouse the orthodox view. As Curtis
Bradley and Trevor Morrison have explained, there is typically an
inverse relationship between, on one hand, the clarity of the
Constitution’s text and, on the other hand, the ability of nontextual

481. Amir Tibon, Trump Reportedly Confirms Kushner to Serve as Mideast Peace Broker,
HAARETZ (Jan. 16, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-reportedlyconfirms-kushner-to-serve-as-mideast-peace-broker-1.5486300 [https://perma.cc/QEC8-DZQQ].
482. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, Another Obama Fundraiser Turns Out to be a Bad Ambassador,
FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/23/another-obamafundraiser-turns-out-to-be-a-bad-ambassador [https://perma.cc/EY9E-ERWC] (discussing the
poor performance of Nicole Avant, a political fundraiser whom the Senate confirmed as
ambassador to the Bahamas).
483. See, e.g., Paul Richter, Obama Donor George Tsunis Ends His Nomination as Norway
Ambassador, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fgnorway-ambassador-nominee-withdraws-20141213-story.html
[https://perma.cc/DT48-UF38]
(reporting that George Tsunis withdrew his nomination after a poor performance at his
confirmation hearing provoked a political backlash).
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considerations to dictate legality; “[t]he more an interpreter
deems . . . evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear,
the less likely the interpreter is to credit [nontextual arguments] that
point[] in a different direction.”484 On this view, the textual case against
unilateral appointments means, at a minimum, that the argument in
favor of the practice will be harder to sustain. The question is not
whether the Senate is justified in inserting itself into the matter of
irregular diplomatic appointments, but whether the president is
justified in rejecting the original model of shared governance by acting
alone.
The analysis also helps to further elucidate the original
relationship between the Constitution and international law. Some
recent Justices have expressed an aversion to the use of international
law as an input in constitutional interpretation, at least in certain areas
such as the Eighth Amendment.485 The historical sources, however,
show that the framers had no such aversion with respect to the
Appointments Clause. Intriguingly, this means that international law,
at least in appointments, should be most relevant to those who have
otherwise expressed the strongest objections to its relevance, and
perhaps least relevant to those who have otherwise embraced its
utilization.
The analysis also enriches current understanding of the way in
which international norms have shaped the separation of powers. Jean
Galbraith has demonstrated that the law of nations strengthened the
president vis-à-vis Congress in areas such as recognition, war powers,
and treaty making.486 Under the Appointments Clause, however, the
original effect of the law of nations was precisely the opposite—the
empowerment of the Senate at the expense of the president. On this
account, it is the gradual domestication of the meaning of “public
Ministers,” accomplished through a subtle grafting of Hartwell’s
conception of “officer,” that has liberated modern presidents from the

484. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 430 (2012).
485. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86 (2015) (relying in part on
international law to determine the scope of the president’s power to recognize foreign borders);
Ingrid Wuerth, International Decision, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
United States Supreme Court, June 8, 2015, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 636, 638–40 (2015) (discussing the
use of international law in Zivotofsky by both the majority and the dissent).
486. See generally Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers,
99 VA. L. REV. 987 (2013).
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need for advice and consent with respect to many ad hoc diplomats.
This suggests a more complicated story about the rise of executive
power, with international law serving less as a reliable causative force
than as an occasional tool of convenience, to be deployed by the
president when helpful but otherwise disregarded.
Finally, the early evidence regarding special envoys sheds light on
the utility of history in the ongoing contest between the political
branches for control over foreign relations. By citing to Founding-era
sources, OLC’s 2007 opinion on the Appointments Clause strongly
suggests that modern custom reflects the original meaning of the
Constitution.487 Yet such a position, as I hope to have shown, is
extremely difficult to square with the weight of the evidence. This not
only raises questions about OLC’s objectivity,488 it also raises the
possibility that the executive branch deploys revisionism as a device by
which to normalize and legitimate historically aberrational features of
the status quo. By reconfiguring the past—by “inventing tradition”—
OLC is able to create the appearance of historical continuity and thus
tap into the Founding as an added source of authority.489 Together with
justiciability and remedial doctrines that complicate private efforts to
enforce the separation of powers,490 and structural conditions that
disadvantage Congress in horizontal struggles with the executive
branch,491 such revisionism plausibly operates as a material sociological
contributor to executive primacy.
CONCLUSION
The presidency’s ascent to dominance in foreign affairs has relied
in part on a pervasive belief in the basic competence and character of

487. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 16, at 100–05.
488. Cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process
of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63 (2011) (“[I]n spite of
episodes like the notorious ‘torture memos,’ OLC has earned a well-deserved reputation for
providing credible, authoritative, thorough and objective legal analysis.”).
489. Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983) (“‘Invented tradition’ is taken to
mean a set of practices . . . which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”).
490. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 676–
85 (2016).
491. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 484, at 438–47 (arguing that Congress is poorly
suited to defend its institutional prerogatives from encroachment by the executive branch).
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the individual who rises to occupy the nation’s highest office. That
belief now appears less pervasive than at any time since the 1970s, if
not earlier. In this state of affairs, the questions of whether and how to
pull back from executive hegemony acquire new relevance, and their
resolution may carry serious implications for the nature of U.S.
engagement with the world. The foregoing analysis suggests that a
revitalized Appointments Clause might serve as one useful mechanism
by which to reign in the executive and restore the separation of powers.

